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This  paper  attempts  to  assess  the  degree  to  which  CEE  candidate  countries  fulfill 
Optimal Currency Area criteria set out in the literature. The literature review provided focuses on 
the seminal contributions of Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963) and later evolution of the theory 
as  well  as  papers  related  to  CEE  candidate  countries.  The  empirical  analysis  indicates  that 
candidate countries are already very open to trade with the EU, in many cases much more open 
than  the  members  of  the  EU  themselves.  Nonetheless,  results  of  the  static  real  activity  co-
movements,  with  the  exception  of  Hungary  and  Slovenia,  point  to  weak  or  even  negative 
correlations of shocks in the Euro-zone and respective acceding economies. Another approach 
pursued  in  the  paper  involves  examining  the  nominal  and  real  exchange  rate  variability  to 
determine whether the exchange rate flexibility constitutes an important instrument of absorbing 
asymmetric  shocks.  From  the  comparison  of  the  exchange  rate  stability  in  CEE  with  that  of 
ClubMed countries in the years preceding the formation of the EMU it follows that the candidate 
countries as a group resemble the ClubMed countries in the early, rather than, mid 1990s. 
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1.  Introduction 
The question whether candidate countries fit the Optimum-Currency-Area (OCA) criteria has been 
the subject of growing empirical literature. Recently the issue was taken up in the context of European 
transition economies.  No wonder, after the 8 countries of Central Europe and the Baltics as well as 
Cyprus and Malta will become members of the enlarged European Union in May 2004, upon fulfillment 
of the Maastricht criteria, they might decide on their own path of acceding into the Euro-zone. It is 
obvious  that  such  a  decision  should  be  based  on  careful  consideration  of  all  pros  and  cons  of 
becoming a part vs. staying outside of the monetary union. The OCA theory with its many empirical 
operationalizations offers a valuable and concise tool to assess these costs and benefits and thus 
might be very helpful in assisting the 10 new prospective EU members in taking this important decision.  
The intention of the authors of this paper was to carefully review the existing literature of the 
OCA with the special focus on the seminal contributions of Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963) 
and the later evolution of the theory. The part of the literature review concerning the empirical 
applications of the OCA theory focuses on the growing volume of empirical literature concerning 
the  candidate  countries.  The  purpose  of  this  part  of  the  review  was  to  describe  the  state  of 
knowledge regarding the suitability of candidate countries to access the Euro zone, to present 
various approaches to measuring this suitability and to motivate the approach taken by the authors 
in the empirical part of the paper. 
The  empirical  part  of  the  paper  involves  investigating  the  OCA-implied  criteria  using  two 
different approaches. First, we examine a number of conventional OCA criteria, like the openness 
to trade with the EU as well as business cycle co-movements between the Euro-zone and the 
accession countries. This is done using various indicators, several sample periods at both annual 
and quarterly frequencies to check the sensitivity of results and ensure robustness of conclusions.  
The second approach involves examination of nominal and real exchange rate (RER) volatility 
and  pursues  another  important  stream  in  empirical  OCA  literature.  The  rationale  for  using 
exchange  rate  variability  as  an  OCA  criterion  stems  from  the  assumption  that  frequent  and 
sizeable exchange rate fluctuations are the evidence for idiosyncratic shocks and suggest that by 
joining the currency union the country might deprive itself of an important adjustment instrument. It 
might be argued that such an approach ignores the other important sources of exchange rate 
volatility (such as for example “emerging market contagion”) but its undisputable advantages are 
the comprehensiveness with which it reflects the impact of the shocks. Instead of focusing on the 
efficiency  of  potential  adjustment  mechanisms  (i.e.  factor  mobility,  fiscal  flows)  or  sources  of 
potential idiosyncratic shocks (i.e. trade similarity) this approach uses all this information by looking 
at the actual pass-through of shocks to the exchange rate (Gros and Hobza, 2003).  
The central part of the variance approach concentrates on investigating unexpected variances 
of real exchange rates between respective candidate countries and the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) members treated as a group as well as RER volatility of selected current EMU members 
before and after 1999.  
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2.  Literature review 
2.1  Origins of the OCA 
Mundell’s paper 
The origins to the modern OCA theory are certainly to be traced to the 1961 seminal paper by 
Mundell (Mundell, 1961). Mundell presents a simple model of two entities (countries, regions) with 
fixed exchange rates that are initially in full employment and balance of payments equilibrium. 
These  countries  experience  a  demand  shift  from  goods  of  entity  B  to  the  goods  of  entity  A. 
Assuming  that  wages  and  prices  cannot  be  reduced  in  the  short  run  without  causing 
unemployment and monetary policy counteracts inflation, Mundell presents 2 alternative cases.  If 
these  entities  are  countries  with  national  currencies  (with  fixed  exchange  rate  regimes),  the 
demand shift from B to A causes unemployment in B and inflationary pressures in A. If these 
pressures are restrained by restrictive monetary policies in A, all the burden of adjustment is thrust 
onto B which has to go through a severe recession. 
On the other hand, if these entities are regions in the same country (with the same currency), 
unemployment  in  B  will  trigger  money  expansion  which  will  undoubtedly  magnify  inflation 
pressures  in  A.  Consequently,  a  full-employment  policy  of  the  central  bank  will  raise  prices  in 
region A and turn the terms of trade in favor of B which will complete the adjustment process.  
A currency area whether comprising countries (with fixed exchange rates) or regions (with a 
single currency) will always imply a trade-off between willingness of countries/regions to inflate or 
thrusting  the  burden  of  adjustment  on  the  real  sector  and  provoking  recessions  in  deficit 
countries/regions. Therefore Mundell suggests re-considering the domain of the currency areas, 
i.e.  the  division  of  the  world  into  different  currency  areas  with  flexible  exchange  rates.  These 
should correspond to the homogenous regions rather than heterogeneous nations or states. If the 
North American continent is divided such that the West produces lumber and the East produces 
cars,  flexible  US/Canadian  exchange  rate  will  not  alleviate  the  problem  in  the  case  of  sudden 
demand shift from cars to lumber. Such a shift will result in either unemployment in the East or 
inflation in the West or a combination of the two. Because the currencies correspond to nations 
rather than regions, flexible exchange rate will not serve the purpose of correcting imbalances in 
the balance of payments between regions. If instead, Western and Eastern currencies were in 
place, the depreciation of the Western dollar would restore the balance of payments equilibrium. In 
this  case,  by  applying  appropriate  monetary  policies  to  ensure  constant  effective  demand, 
respective central banks could avoid inflation in the West and unemployment in the East. 
In Mundell’s view, the case for flexible exchange rates is only strong if it applies to regional 
rather than national currencies and thus makes an optimal currency area a region rather than a 
country. Therefore, the system of flexible exchange rates which was suggested as an alternative to 
the gold-standard mechanism (widely blamed for spreading the depression of 1929) only makes  
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sense if regional currencies are in use. Otherwise, recessions in specific regions will be transmitted 
to other regions precisely as was the case with countries during the Great Depression.  
In  an  attempt  to  operationalize  the  concept  of  regions,  Mundell  points  to  factor  mobility. 
Regions should be entities with high internal and low external mobility of factors of production. To 
the extent that regions so defined correspond to countries, a regional currency will be a national 
currency.  However,  when  regions  cut  across  borders  of  countries  that  are  themselves 
multiregional, the case for national currencies is not valid any more and the optimal currency area 
theory calls for abandoning national currencies in favor of regional ones. With the view in mind that 
currencies are mainly an expression of national sovereignty, Mundell adds that such an approach 
to currency areas might be politically unfeasible, except in a few examples, such as ex-colonial 
areas and Western Europe.  
Because of his advancements of the concept of a signel currency, Mundell is sometimes called 
the spiritual father of the euro. In his article, Mundell cites and comments the works of Meade 
(1957) and Scitovsky (1958) on the perspectives on a single European currency. Meade claims 
that these prospects are bleak because of lack of factor mobility in Europe. Even if Scitovsky, 
agrees with the importance of labor mobility and the need to improve it, he also argues that the 
common currency itself will be a strong mobility-stimulating factor. Thus, these authors point to the 
problem that will be later widely debated in the literature, i.e. the problem of endogeneity of criteria 
determining the optimal currency areas.  
According  to  Mundell,  factor  mobility,  because  of  its  many  dimensions  and  measurement 
problems,  is  better  considered  on  a  relative  rather  than  absolute  basis.  This  would  imply  that 
regions should be defined as narrowly as to reflect –every number of the unemployed due to labor 
immobility  (which  is  clearly  against  common  sense).  If  however  one  considers  the  costs  of 
establishing and maintaining a separate currency, the inconvenience associated with dealing with 
abundant  world  currencies,  the  optimal  number  of  common  currency  areas  certainly  drops. 
Nonetheless, Mundell does not offer any practical method to detect the OCA nor does he propose 
concrete criteria to measure the fitness of entities to form an OCA.   
In conclusion, Mundell, states that the ‘stabilization argument for flexible exchange rates is 
only valid if it is based on regional currency areas […] within each of which there is factor mobility 
and between which there is factor immobility’ (p. 663). Being realistic about the unfeasibility of 
assigning the currencies to regions rather than nations, Mundell stresses that the ‘validity of the 
argument for flexible exchange rates […] hinges on the closeness with which nations correspond to 
regions’  (p.  664).  Thus,  the  argument  for  floating  exchange  rates  in  order  to  achieve 
macroeconomic stability is strong if nations have full internal mobility and external immobility of 
factors, but weakens if this is not the case. Furthermore, if factors are mobile across countries, 
flexible exchange rates become unnecessary and may even be harmful.   
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McKinnon’s paper 
McKinnon develops the concept of the OCA by investigating the economic characteristics that 
determine the optimal size of the domain of a single currency. In this ‘optimal’ situation a flexible 
exchange  rate  against  other  currency  areas  along  with  sound  macroeconomic  policies  should 
ensure  the  resolution  of  3  (sometimes  conflicting)  goals:  (1)  full  employment,  (2)  balanced 
international payments and (3) stable internal average price level. McKinnon develops a simple 
model of a single currency area which is small enough to be a price-taker (tradable goods) and 
maintains  a  flexible  exchange  rate  with  the  outside  world  (itself  a  single  currency  area).  The 
country produces tradables: exportables and importables as well as nontradables.  
If the country is very open to foreign trade, i.e. exportables and importables make up a high 
percentage of domestic consumption, a devaluation of the currency would shift production from 
nontradable  to  tradable  goods  and  consumption  in  the  opposite  direction.  This  would  improve 
external balances but would also raise the price level (as tradables constitute a large share of the 
consumption basket) and will force monetary authorities to implement contractionary measures. 
Thus, in a highly open economy, using the exchange rate to improve the Balance of Payments 
(BoP)  will  necessarily  mean  raising  the  price  level  which,  by  itself,  constitutes  a  conflict  of 
objectives  (2)  and  (3).  McKinnon  notes  that  for  economies  that  become  more  open  ‘flexible 
exchange rates become both: less effective as a control device for external balance, and more 
damaging to internal price-level stability’. For such economies, fixing the exchange rate might be 
optimal. In a situation of a balance of payments problem, fiscal and monetary policies might act to 
reduce demand for both exportables and importables. Lower demand for exportables will release 
more of them for exports and lower demand for importables will directly reduce imports and thus 
balance  of  payments  will  be  improved  without  resorting  to  the  exchange  rate.  Since  the 
nontradable  sector  is  small,  lower  demand  for  non-tradables  will  lead  initially  to  small 
unemployment  which  would  be  later  reduced  thanks  to  labor  flows  to  the  tradable  sector.  In 
general, the smaller the non-tradable sector, the more effective domestic macroeconomic policies 
are  in  preventing  unemployment  and  improving  the  balance  of  payments  without  the  use  of  a 
flexible exchange rate.  
On the other hand, if the economy mostly produces non-tradables, i.e. is relatively closed to 
foreign trade, the optimal policy might be to actively use the exchange rate policy, and specifically 
to peg the currency to the non-tradable portion of the basket. Improving the trade balance would 
require  exchange  rate  devaluation,  which,  due  to  the  low  share  of  tradable  goods  in  the 
consumption  basket,  would  not  raise  the  price  level  excessively.  In  contrast,  if  contractionary 
monetary and fiscal policies are actively used to improve the trade balance deficit, unemployment 
will be higher than in the previous case. Relatively large sector of nontradables will suffer weak 
demand, and it might be necessary to push its prices down, before any trade balance improvement 
will take place.  
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Summing up, McKinnon stresses the fact that economies open to foreign trade will find their 
exchange rate a much less effective instrument in dealing with balance of payment problems, due 
to the pass-through of exchange rate movements to the internal price level which reduces the final 
effect on output. In closed economies, on the other hand, devaluing the exchange rate might prove 
a  much  better  way  of  improving  the  balance  of  payments  problems  than  the  internal  macro-
policies. McKinnon mentions that that openness is a continuous characteristic and suggests that 
total exports and imports is a good measure of determining total production of exportables and 
importables.  
In his article, McKinnon also discusses the monetary implications of the model and states that 
for small countries, it might be desirable to peg their currencies to a bundle of importables which 
means almost the same as pegging them to the outside currency. If a currency of a small country 
is not convincingly pegged and thus given appropriate liquidity value, the citizens of such country 
will accumulate foreign bank balances and trigger capital outflows.  
In the final section of the paper McKinnon distinguishes between geographical factor mobility 
among  regions  and  factor  mobility  among  industries.  In  his  opinion  Mundell’s  paper  (Mundell, 
1961) largely refers to the former type of immobility. McKinnon considers two regions: A and B with 
distinct industries and asks what happens when the demand for products from region A rises and 
for products from region B falls. If there is a possibility to set up A-type industries in region B, 
factors  need  not  move  between  regions  while  distinct  currencies  could  ensure  that  monetary 
policies  are  well  tailored  to  maintain  internal  stability  in  both  regions.  However,  more  often, 
developing A-type industries in the region B is not feasible (due to intra-industry immobility) and 
actual  factor  movements  from  B  to  A  might  be  the  only  solution  to  prevent  severe  fall  in  unit 
incomes in B. Then, joining the two regions in a single-currency area might be the best way of 
overcoming  the  problem  of  immobility  since  the  problem  itself  is  endogenous
1
  and  might  be 
alleviated by introducing common currency. He concludes by saying that the ‘criterion of size and 
openness of a single-currency economy in facilitating inter-industry production shifts certainly has 
to be balanced with purely geographic factor-mobility considerations in determining the optimum 
extent of a currency area” (p. 725). 
Conclusion 
In essence, the original concept of the OCA presented in the papers by Mundell and McKinnon 
is based on weighing the costs and benefits of giving up exchange rate flexibility understood to be 
an  instrument  to  deal  with  BoP  shocks.  If,  for  example,  demand  for  exports  from  a  particular 
country  falls,  a  real  depreciation  might  be  necessary  to  maintain  the  BoP  equilibrium  and  full 
employment. With a fixed exchange rate, the real depreciation has to be effected by reduction in 
money wages which takes time and brings about unemployment. Thus, it is argued, exchange rate 
                                                  
1
 McKinnon thinks that the problem of factor mobility in view of the recommended OCA changes should better be 
considered ‘ex-post’ since currency arrangements themselves influence factor mobility. He is the first author to point to 
the problem of endogeneity of OCA criteria which is further discussed in the remainder of this section.  
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depreciation  and  appreciation  can  effectively  take  the  place  of  unemployment  and  inflation 
respectively in dealing with shocks to the BoP especially in the world of sticky nominal wages. 
Giving  up  this  important  stabilization  instrument  would  only  be  justified  in  a  homogenous 
environment with high factor mobility where shocks are symmetrical and well correlated. In such an 
environment, the benefits of exchange rate flexibility would not be needed anymore while benefits 
of currency unions will be fully taken advantage of.  
2.2  Modifications of the theory and reservations 
The  original  OCA  theory  as  put  forth  in  the  Mundell  1961  paper  relies  heavily  on  the 
assumption of stationary expectations of the price level, interest rate and even exchange rate
2
 
(McKinnon,  2000).  In  this  environment,  asymmetric  shocks  suggest  that  single  currency  areas 
should be small, homogenous and with full factor mobility so that policymakers be in position to 
tailor macro-policies as to ensure constancy of demand in these areas. Common shocks are thus 
to be used as a criterion for determining the size of currency areas. 
Several  years  later,  Mundell  modified  his  view  on  OCA  by  dropping  the  assumption  of 
stationary expectations and instead focusing on the exchange rate uncertainty. His 1973 article 
“Uncommon  Arguments  for  Common  Currencies”  (Mundell,  1973a)  emphasized  the  forward-
looking nature of the foreign exchange market and led to conclusions that are in some crucial 
aspects contrary to those of the 1961 paper. While the earlier paper held that asymmetric shocks 
disqualify regions from being a single currency area, the later paper focused on showing how 
having  one  currency  can  help  reduce  effects  of  such  shocks  by  portfolio  diversification  and 
“economizing” on foreign reserves.  
Mundell explains that when a country is hit by a negative shock it can better share the loss with 
the trading partner, if both are part of the single currency area and therefore both hold claims on 
each other’s output in a common currency. In such environment a country hit by a shock can “run 
down its currency holdings and cushion the impact of the loss, drawing on the resources of the 
other country until the cost of the adjustment has been efficiently spread over the future” (Mundell, 
1973a, p. 115). Mundell refers here to the automatic adjustment process that occurs when money 
flows  from  one  region  to  another  and  regional  price  levels  converge.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
countries have their own currencies with flexible exchange rates, the entire burden of the shock 
has  to  be  borne  by  the  affected  country  that  after  the  devaluation  finds  its  domestic-currency 
assets buy less on world markets.  
Mundell proves that two countries economize on reserve holding if they decide to set up a 
single currency area
3
. From this point of view the optimum currency area is the world. However, as 
he points out, such a currency area is unsustainable due to ‘persistent throbs of integrative and 
                                                  
2
 Even if the exchange rate was allowed to float 
3
 This is so because after forming the union, the number of external transactions the citizens engage in is lower in 
comparison with the situation before the creation of the union due to internalising transactions among themselves 
(Mundell, p. 125).     
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disintegrative forces’ that would arise in favor of regional arrangements favoring gold, silver or 
currency standards (p. 125-126). 
In the paper three types of gains associated with monetary unions are identified. The first one 
is connected with insurance that countries gain by the means of risk pooling. Second has to do 
with the above mentioned reserve savings due to internalization of the formerly external trade. The 
third  gain  comes  from  the  economies  of  scale  associated  with  spreading  overhead  costs  of 
transactions and many other types of economies related to the asset side of money.     
In his paper “A Plan for a European Currency”, Mundell (1973b) applies his modified argument 
to the European context. He considers the common currency to be the most efficient means to “kill 
the sporadic and unsettling speculation over currency prices” and postulates that exchange rate be 
given “less flexibility” and in general “taken out of both national and international politics within 
Europe” (p. 147). To reinforce his findings from the earlier 1973 paper, Mundell suggests that in 
spite  of  being  hit  by  idiosyncratic  shocks  (or  maybe because  of  this  fact), European countries 
would be better off using one single currency which would cushion disturbances in the adversely 
hit countries thanks to capital movements. 
This modification is further discussed in a series of papers by McKinnon (recently in McKinnon, 
2000)  who  explicitly  criticizes  one  of  the  basic  assumption  of  early  Mundell,  i.e.  the  postwar 
Keynesian belief that national monetary and fiscal policies could successfully fine tune aggregate 
demand in response to shocks. Giving up this instrument is the central argument against adopting 
single  currency  in  the  original  OCA  theory  and  Mundell’s  discussion  of  asymmetric  shocks  as 
criteria for the cost-benefit analysis explicitly hinges on the assumption that the autonomy of the 
national macro-policies implies solely benefits and involves no risks and costs. In particular, the 
crucial assumption underlying Mundell’s original OCA theory is the belief that a flexible exchange 
rate would be smoothly and continuously adjusting to stabilize the domestic economy. McKinnon 
(2000) observes that such an opinion was shared even by monetarists such as Milton Friedman, 
who  were  fond  of  Mundell’s  case  for  an  independent  monetary  policy,  albeit  for  a  somewhat 
different  reason.  They  thought  that  the  autonomy  of  the  monetary  policy  could  be  the  best 
safeguard of domestic price levels and that the floating exchange rate would reflect naturally the 
stance of domestic monetary policy
4
. However, the great volatility of exchange rates in the 1970s 
and the series of currency crises in the 1990s obviously sheds new light on the assumption of 
benefits of floating and thus makes the original OCA theory somewhat less convincing. Over the 
years  floating  exchange  rates  have  proved  to  provide  not  only  an  outlet  for  macroeconomic 
adjustments, but very frequently also to be a source of instabilities and a subject of speculations. 
In recent papers Ching and Devereux (2000, 2003) re-visit Mundell’s 1973 article and try to 
model costs and benefits of joining a single currency area in light of the Mundell’s findings related 
to international risk sharing. In their 2000 paper, Ching and Devereux evaluate the risk sharing 
benefits  of  a  single  currency  area  by  adding  to  the  Mundell’s  reasoning  the  possibility  of 
                                                  
4
 Appreciate in the case of tight policy and depreciate in the case of the loose policy.  
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international insurance arrangements through capital markets. Such markets provide an alternative 
to forming currency unions. Using the modeling approach, the authors show that currency unions 
may support risk sharing that could not be achieved under floating exchange regimes under the 
condition that the trade in national currency-denominated bonds is rather limited. This condition is 
met  in  the  case  of  transition  economies  as  evidenced  in  Eichengreen  and  Hausmann  (1999). 
Quantitative evaluation of the model done by the authors suggests that the risk sharing benefits 
can be substantial. 
In  a  more  complete  approach  Ching  and  Devereux  (Ching  and  Devereux,  2003)  combine 
Mundell’s OCA findings from 1961 with the later ones from 1973 and jointly model the benefits of 
single currency areas implied by risk sharing as well as costs related to the loss of the exchange 
rate  as  an  adjusting  instrument  in  the  presence  asymmetric  shocks.  With  the  assumption  that 
capital  markets  are  limited  in  their  capacity  to  insure  consumption,  authors  compare  a  single 
currency area to the group of autonomous currency areas. They find that the presence of country 
specific shocks may either reduce or enhance the benefits of a single currency area depending on 
the relative significance of the exchange rate instrument vis-à-vis the risk sharing.  
Both papers constitute and important voice in the discussion on the OCA theory and offer 
interesting insights into the benefits of forming single currency areas. Nevertheless, they do not 
provide with any practical tool of measuring costs and benefits in a coherent and comprehensive 
manner. Thus, their findings remain on the theoretical level and wait to be implemented in the 
context of the concrete countries or groups of countries.    
Another important challenge of the original OCA theory came from Frankel and Rose (1998) 
and Rose (2000). They argue with the ‘static’ concept of OCA criteria that were conventionally 
used to judge on the importance of autonomous monetary policy. To gauge the fitness of the 
country to join the currency area, the common approach has been to look at the following aspects 
of the candidate country’s economy: the extent of trade with the currency area, similarity of shocks, 
the  degree  of  labor  mobility  and  the  system  of  fiscal  transfers.  However,  after  the  empirical 
analysis of the data spanning 30 years and 20 industrialized countries, Frankel and Rose (1998) 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  most,  if  not  all  of  these  criteria  are  endogenous  (or  ‘jointly 
endogenous’)
5
. From the theoretical point of view increased trade need not lead to closer business 
cycle correlation. It does so if trade is mostly intra-industry and because of effects of demand 
shocks. On the other hand, if joining the union leads to industry specializations, then increased 
trade occurs mostly on the inter-industry level and may result in developing more and not less 
asynchronous business cycles. Supported by the empirical results, Frankel and Rose find a strong 
positive  relationship  between  the  degree  of  bilateral  trade  intensity  and  the  cross-country 
correlation of business cycles. Thus, because accession to the currency area -through eliminating 
the currency risk and lowering of transaction costs- automatically produces a significant boost to 
                                                  
5
 Such opinions are already to be found in earlier works on OCA, including Mundell (1961) and Kenen (1969) but 
were not supported by empirical calculations.   
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trade and consequently, brings the countries’ business cycles together, the related standard OCA 
criteria are endogenous and should better be considered ex-post.  
Frankel  and  Rose  argue  that  deciding  on  the  appropriateness  of  countries’  accession  to 
currency  unions  based  on  historical  data  correlations  constitutes  a  classic  embodiment  of  the 
“Lucas  Critique”.  Nevertheless,  they  do  not  reject  the  standard  OCA  criteria  as  irrelevant,  but 
rather, argue that “a country is more likely to satisfy […] (them) ex post than ex ante” (Frankel and 
Rose, 1998).   
2.3  Empirical contributions (CEE focus)  
Since the seminal contributions of Mundell and McKinnon in the 1960s, the literature on OCA 
has  expanded  very  quickly,  most  recently  due  to  the  interest  triggered  by  the  EU  and  EMU 
enlargement. The vast majority of papers involves attempts to verify empirically the advisability of 
forming new or expanding existing single currency areas. In spite of fundamental modifications of 
the theory done by the originator himself (Mundell, 1973) and investigated recently by Ching and 
Devereux (Ching and Devereux, 2000 and 2003), almost all of the empirical research is based on 
the early Mundell findings (Mundell, 1961). Specifically, assumption is commonly made that the 
asymmetry of shocks that the country (region) is subjected to is the main argument against joining 
the currency union. Thus, the smaller the asymmetry, the more appropriate a candidate for the 
union the country is considered. Much less frequently the issue of labor mobility and fiscal transfers 
as OCA criteria is being taken up. The line of empirical shock-asymmetry-related literature can be 
broadly divided into several groups according to the methodological approach they take in defining 
and measuring the shocks. 
One  part  of  this  literature  uses  the  methodology  of  Blanchard  and  Quah  to  estimate  the 
shocks. In their seminal article (Blanchard and Quah, 1989), Blanchard and Quah estimate VARs 
to extract underlying demand and supply shocks. Demand shocks are identified from the VAR 
residuals  as  the  component  that  has  only  temporary  effect  on  output  while  supply  shocks  are 
allowed to have permanent effects. Demand and supply shocks extracted in such a way for the 
whole currency union are then compared for individual current and prospective union members.   
This  methodology  has  been  used  by  Eichengreen  and  Bayoumi  in  several  papers  written 
during  the  1990.  In  their  1993  paper,  Bayoumi  and  Eichengreen  verify  whether  the  EMU 
constitutes the OCA. To do this they check correlations of supply and demand shocks recovered 
from the VAR
6
 for individual countries with the German shocks. French and Belgian as well as (to a 
lesser extent) Dutch and Danish supply shocks were found to be very highly correlated with the 
German  ones  while  the  rest  of  the  countries  exhibited  generally  lower  correlations  (or  even 
negative – in the case of Ireland). Correlations of demand shocks were found to be generally much 
lower. Based on their results, the authors divided the European Union into the “core” (evaluated as 
OCA) and “periphery” subject to bigger and more asymmetrical shocks. Authors compared the 
                                                  
6
 estimated using annual data over the period 1960-1988  
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magnitude of divergence of shocks to those among the US regions to conclude that ‘underlying 
shocks are significantly more idiosyncratic across EC countries than across US regions, which may 
indicate  that  the  EC  will  find  it  more  difficult  to  operate  a  monetary  union”  (Bayoumi  and 
Eichengreen, 1993). This opinion was confirmed by notions concerning alternative OCA indicators: 
labor  mobility,  wage  flexibility,  inter-state  budgetary  transfers  are  all  lower  and  less  flexible  in 
Europe than in the US. The same authors updated their work in the later article (Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen,  1999)  using  6  years  of  additional  data.  Conclusions  regarding  the  degree  and 
asymmetry of shocks remained largely unchanged which speaks against the hypothesis of the 
endogenous nature of the OCA criteria and specifically of the declining idiosyncrasy of shocks 
affecting countries already in the union.   
Subsequently, the Blanchard-Quah methodology of extracting shocks was used in numerous 
papers to evaluate the optimality of currency areas constituted by the US states, post-colonial 
groups of countries as well as the EU. More recently, the interest is focused on the group of 10 
new members of the EU that will have to decide upon their own strategies to enter the Euro-zone.  
Frankel et al. (1999) used the analogous methodology to recover supply and demand shocks 
for the EU countries and most of the CEECs using quarterly data series for the period 1992Q1-
1998Q2. The authors find that the correlation between the Euro area (proxied by Germany and 
France) and the non-euro EU countries is quite high, in contrast to the correlation with the CEECs. 
However, one has to bear in mind that the sample period includes early stages of transition (quite 
obviously full of idiosyncratic shocks related to structural changes) for most countries and ends in 
1998  when  joining  the  EU  for  most  CEECs  was  a  rather  distant  perspective.  In  other  words, 
correlation between the business cycles in the CEESs and the Euro-zone was found very low as 
the real sector developments in CEE were driven by quite different forces than those in the Euro-
zone (particularly in the first half of the 1990s).  
Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001) also use the Blanchard-Quah methodology to identify demand 
and supply shocks. They use an expanded quarterly dataset starting in the mid-1990s and ending 
in 2000 for most CEECs and for the first time calculate the correlation of shocks with the whole 
Euro-area (and not just Germany and France). The authors found that some accession countries 
have a quite high correlation of shocks with the Euro area. This is particularly true of Hungary 
(supply and demand shocks) and Estonia (supply shocks). A much lower correlation was found for 
Slovenia and Czech Republic. For all the rest of CEECs shocks remain mostly idiosyncratic. The 
authors also found that the economic integration of the current EU members is going at a high 
speed and is much higher now than in previous decades. 
A different approach was taken by Korhonen (2001) who uses monthly indices of industrial 
production to estimate a series of bivariate VARs with industrial production in the Euro-zone and 9 
CEECs. Business cycle co-movement was measured by the correlation of impulse responses of 
industrial production of both Euro area and respective accession country to the Euro area shock. 
High correlation was detected for Hungary and Slovenia while smaller for Czech Republic and 
Estonia. Furthermore, correlation coefficients for the most closely correlated accession countries  
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are close to those of the current members and in some cases even higher (e.g. Hungary seems to 
be better correlated with the euro area than Portugal).   
In a more direct approach, Boone and Maurel (1998) check the correlation of business cycles 
by  calculating  the  correlation  between  cyclical  components
7
  of  industrial  production  and 
unemployment rate for the accession countries (except for the Baltic states) and Germany as well 
as the EU. Correlations with Germany are found to be much bigger than those for the entire EU. 
The same authors in their 1999 paper apply a different methodology to a limited sample of CEECs: 
Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland  and  Slovakia.  They  model  unemployment  rate  in  accession 
countries  with  the  autoregressive  terms  as well  as  the  EU  unemployment  rate.  The  degree  of 
business cycle correlation is then evaluated by looking at the share of variation of the accession 
country unemployment rate explained by the EU and German unemployment rate. Additionally, 
correlation of impulse responses to the EU and German shocks are investigated. All countries are 
found to score high on the first correlation measure (particularly Hungary and Slovakia), while for 
the impulse responses indicator Poland and Slovakia are leading the group. In conclusion, the 
authors state that since the correlation with the German business cycles is quite close for all of 
them, benefits of joining the Euro zone outweigh the costs. 
Fidrmuc (2001) investigates the Frankel and Rose (1998) endogeneity hypothesis using the 
cross-section data of OECD countries form the 1990s incl. the CEE OECD members. Frankel and 
Rose argued that joining the union significantly increases trade volume and that the reduction in 
business cycle divergences further propagates trade. Hence, both the degree of trade with the 
currency  area  in  question  (measured  commonly  by  the  share  of  exports  to  the  area  in  GDP), 
similarity of shocks and correlation of business cycles, are themselves endogenous and must to be 
taken  with  highest  caution  as  indicators  of  countries’  readiness  to  join  the  union.  Fidrmuc 
confirmed that intra-industry trade triggers convergence of business cycles but found no evidence 
of  the  relationship  between  business  cycle  and  bilateral  trade  intensity.  Furthermore,  he  finds 
business cycles in Hungary, Slovenia and (to a lesser extent) Poland to be quite closely correlated 
with the German business cycle (understood as de-trended industrial production). Also, thanks to 
an already high degree of intra-industry trade, there is a potential for decreasing business cycle 
divergences in the accession countries vis-à-vis the EU (the case for Hungary, Slovenia, Poland, 
Czech Republic and Slovakia). 
Static OCA indicators were frequently analyzed to assess the accession countries’ openness 
to  trade  with  the  EU  and  the  vulnerability  of  foreign  trade  to  Euro  exchange  rate  fluctuations. 
Bratkowski and Rostowski (2001) as well as Fidrmuc and Schardax (2000) provide evidence that 
most accession countries have already managed to reorient their trade towards EU and intensify 
intra-industry trade with the EU and that the process is likely to continue. More recently, Gros and 
Hobza  (2003)  provide  empirical  evidence  on  the  set  of  conventional  OCA  indicators  for  the 
accession countries. Conventional static indicators evaluated by the authors include the share of 
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 Cyclical components are obtained with the use of Hodrick-Prescott filter  
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exports to EU15 in GDP (data from 2000), correlations of real GDP growth, the rate of change of 
industrial production and changes in the unemployment rate (annual data 1993/4-2000) as well as 
intra-industry  and  trade  structure  similarity  indicators  (data  from  2000).  These  indicators  were 
calculated  for  8  CEE  accession  countries  as  well  as  Germany  and  Greece.  The  results  were 
mixed. Authors found that both trade structure and intra-industry trade in most cases approach the 
levels typical for current EMU members and share of EU-oriented exports might even be higher 
than respective share of current EMU members. However, the 3 indicators of business cycle co-
movement provide mixed results with some countries (like Hungary and Slovenia) exhibiting high 
real GDP and industrial output correlations, while the rest being far away from close co-movement 
often  exhibiting  negative  correlations.  Unemployment  rate  changes  were  found  negatively 
correlated in the case of most countries.  
Another important stream of empirical OCA literature purses the investigation of exchange rate 
variability. The rationale here is straightforward. Instead of concentrating on potential sources of 
asymmetric  shocks,  authors  look  at  the  real  exchange  rate  volatility  assuming  that  unstable 
exchange rate would be a sign of adjustments to asymmetric shocks. Thus, this approach involves 
a  more  complete  and  straightforward  measure  of  shocks  and  points  to  the  extent  to  which 
economies adjust to asymmetric shocks through the exchange rate channel. Consequently, the 
stability of the observed real exchange rate is taken to be an evidence for the lack of asymmetric 
shocks and hence business cycle co-movement. 
This  approach  was  pioneered  by  Vaubel  (1976,  1978)  and  relies  on  the  conventional 
assumption that when markets are subject to asymmetric shocks, exchange rate would cushion 
these shocks and hence adjust upwards or downwards. The most useful aspect of this method is 
that  it  incorporates  many  fundamental  economic  factors,  which  determine  real  exchange 
movements:  factor  mobility,  the  degree  of  market  diversification,  fiscal  integration,  degree  of 
openness, etc (see Vaubel, 1976 for details). The problem with this approach is that it is very 
difficult  to  capture  exchange  rate  movements  caused  by,  for  example,  exogenous  shocks  – 
namely, by contagion effects transmitted through financial flows or by other random exchange rate 
movements which are not necessarily related to asymmetric shocks.  
Following Vaubel (1976), von Hagen et al., (1994) use the unexpected variance criterion to 
answer the question whether Europe is ready for a common currency. The authors compare the 
RER variance within the existing currency union in Europe constituted by the six West German 
Lander with the variance of the same six Lander with several European countries. Their results 
suggest  a  ‘Europe  of  Two  Speeds’  and  the  further  need  for  the  reduction  in  real  exchange 
variability,  between  the  ‘the  core’  and  Denmark,  Italy  and  the  UK.  They  also  report  a  further 
lowering in real exchange rate variability among six West German Lander, i.e., within an existing 
currency union. 
The  recent  paper  by  Gros  and  Hobza  (2003)  also  includes  the  analysis  of  exchange  rate 
variability. The conclusion of this analysis is that real and nominal exchange rate of the 8 acceding  
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CEECs behaves in the same way as the one of Club Med
8
 countries during the early 1990s. If the 
different degree of nominal variability is taken account of, the accession countries were found to 
have an even lower variability than the Club Med. Hence, the overall results suggest that most of 
the standard OCA criteria calculated for accession countries take on values that equally or even 
more strongly speak in favor of joining the EMU compared to the ones calculated for the Club Med 
in the early 1990s. 
3.  Standard static OCA indicators 
In an attempt to answer the question of whether the candidate countries can be regarded as 
potential well-fitting members of the Euro zone, we made a selection of the conventional criteria 
offered by the OCA literature. The choice of the particular approaches that we adopted was mostly 
governed by their usefulness and methodological appeal as well as the intention to fill in the blanks 
in  the  CEEC-related  OCA  empirical  literature.  Therefore  we  followed  a  relatively  infrequently 
applied  approach  of  exchange  rate  variability  as  the  most  straightforward  and  comprehensive 
measure of the actual ‘stabilizing’ function of the exchange rate. In addition, in this chapter we 
examine standard indicators often mentioned and empirically verified in the OCA literature. This 
has been done in numerous papers so far (e.g. Fidrmuc and Schardax, 2000; Bratkowski and 
Rostowski, 2001; Gros and Hobza, 2003) but we think that it is important to monitor these crucial 
indicators closely and analyze most recent estimates.   
In line with the original OCA theory openness to trade and the degree of shock asymmetry are 
crucial factors in any country’s cost-benefit accounting related to joining a single-currency area. In 
our paper we analyze the following indicators calculated for the CEEC candidate countries vis-à-vis 
the European Union. 
1. Correlation of the real GDP annual growth rates 
2. Correlation of the annual growth rates of volumes of industrial production 
3. Correlation of annual rates of changes of the unemployment rate 
4. Share of exports to the EU15
9
 as percent of GDP 
5. Share of exports to the EU15 as percent of total exports. 
3.1  Trade with the EU 
The fourth and fifth indicators provide a straightforward measure of the extent of trade links 
with the EU, a criterion for the OCA analysis that can be traced back to McKinnon. Countries 
whose  foreign  trade  pattern  exhibit  high  gravity  towards  the  Euro-dominated  EU  should  be 
considered more appropriate candidates for joining the currency area.   
                                                  
8
 Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. 
9
 Trade with EU15 was taken as a proxy for trade with Eurozone due to better data availability.  
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Table  3.1 presents  both  imports  from  and exports  to  EU15  as  %  of  GDP  for  9  accession 
countries, Bulgaria and Romania as well as EU15 member states for the period 1999-2002. The 
crucial parameter, i.e. share of exports in GDP for the full most recent available year 2002 has 
been marked bold. The main message that the table conveys is that of a surprisingly large and 
consistently growing importance of EU15 as market for exports for the accession countries. With 
the exception of Cyprus whose exports to the EU account for a mere 4% of GDP, all accession 
countries export to the EU well above 10% of their GDP: ranging from 15% for Poland to 38% for 
the Czech Republic. This is a particularly good result when compared with the current members of 
the Euro zone, particularly Greece (4%), Italy (11%), Spain (13%) and France (14%).  
Table 3.1 Trade with EU as % of GDP, 1999-2002 
Trade with EU - 15 as % of GDP 
1999  2000  2001  2002  1999  2000  2001  2002  1999  2000  2001  2002  Country 
Imports  Exports  Imports + Exports 
Bulgaria  20.6  22.7  26.3  25.2  16.1  19.6  20.6  20.0  36.7  42.4  46.9  45.2 
Romania  18.0  19.9  22.2  22.8  15.6  17.9  19.2  20.4  33.6  37.8  41.4  43.2 
Cyprus  20.7  22.5  21.7  21.2  4.3  3.9  4.1  4.2  25.0  26.4  25.8  25.4 
Czech Republic  32.8  38.7  39.4  35.2  33.0  38.7  40.3  37.7  65.8  77.4  79.7  72.9 
Estonia  43.1  51.7  44.0  42.7  33.3  47.2  41.7  35.9  76.4  98.9  85.7  78.7 
Hungary  37.6  40.2  37.6  29.8  39.7  45.3  43.7  36.3  77.3  85.5  81.3  66.1 
Latvia  24.2  23.3  24.0  25.5  16.2  16.8  16.0  16.4  40.4  40.2  40.0  41.9 
Lithuania  21.1  21.1  23.5  24.8  14.1  16.3  18.4  19.2  35.2  37.4  42.0  44.0 
Poland  19.2  18.3  16.9  18.0  12.5  13.5  13.7  14.9  31.7  31.8  30.5  32.8 
Slovenia  34.6  36.2  35.1  33.8  28.1  29.4  29.5  27.9  62.8  65.6  64.6  61.7 
Slovak Republic  29.0  31.6  35.9  35.3  30.1  35.6  37.0  37.0  59.1  67.2  72.9  72.3 
EU-15  14.6  15.8  15.5  14.7  15.5  16.9  16.8  16.1  30.2  32.7  32.3  30.8 
Belgium/ 
Luxembourg  49.5  55.0  54.9  52.0  57.0  62.6  63.0  59.9  106.5  117.7  117.9  111.9 
Denmark  18.2  19.4  19.2  19.3  17.4  18.8  18.3  18.1  35.7  38.2  37.4  37.4 
 Germany  11.9  13.8  13.8  13.1  14.5  16.6  17.0  16.8  26.3  30.4  30.7  30.0 
Greece  16.1  14.8  14.8  14.0  4.7  4.2  4.2  3.9  20.9  19.0  19.0  17.9 
Spain  16.5  17.2  16.3  15.4  13.2  14.0  13.7  13.1  29.8  31.2  30.0  28.5 
France  12.2  13.9  13.6  12.8  13.2  14.4  14.1  13.7  25.4  28.3  27.8  26.5 
Ireland  26.7  28.5  28.4  23.7  48.3  49.5  49.1  44.7  75.0  78.1  77.5  68.4 
Italy  11.4  12.2  12.0  11.3  11.5  12.0  11.8  10.9  22.9  24.2  23.8  22.2 
Netherlands  22.5  23.0  21.0  19.5  31.0  34.3  34.2  32.0  53.5  57.3  55.2  51.5 
Austria  22.1  22.7  22.8  21.9  18.2  19.3  20.0  20.1  40.3  42.0  42.8  42.0 
Portugal  27.0  28.1  26.9  24.2  17.7  18.3  17.8  16.7  44.7  46.4  44.7  40.9  
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Finland  13.8  14.7  14.0  13.4  18.1  20.3  18.2  17.4  31.9  35.0  32.2  30.9 
Sweden  17.4  18.3  17.4  16.6  17.3  17.6  16.9  16.3  34.7  35.9  34.3  33.0 
United Kingdom  11.1  11.1  11.0  10.7  10.0  10.5  10.1  9.5  21.1  21.6  21.1  20.2 
source: CANSTAT – Candidate Countries Statistical Bulletin www.insse.ro/canstat_Q1/canstat.htm and AMECO 
database of the EUROSTAT 
The following table, Table 3.2, presents the analogous indicators for the EU15 for the early 1990s, 
when the so-called Club Med (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain) was preparing to join the ERM to later 
adopt the Euro
10
. The share of exports to EU15 as % of GDP during 1991-1995 for Greece, Spain and 
Italy is much lower than respective values for 1999-2002 for Poland, which is the accession country 
with the lowest value of the indicator (except Cyprus). Portugal, the most EU oriented of all Club Med 
countries in terms of exports, was characterized by values in the range of 15-17% during first half of the 
90s; very close to current values of Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, but more than twice lower than the 
accession leaders: Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Estonia. 
Table 3.2 Trade with EU as % of GDP, 1992-1995 
Trade with EU - 15 as % of GDP 
1992  1993  1994  1995  1992  1993  1994  1995  1992  1993  1994  1995 
Country  Imports  Exports  Imports + Exports 
EU-15  13.4  11.9  12.8  13.7  13.4  12.6  13.6  14.5  26.8  24.5  26.4  28.2 
Greece  15.6  14.8  14.5  15.4  6.8  5.5  5.3  5.7  22.3  20.4  19.9  21.1 
Italy  9.6  8.8  9.9  11.2  8.9  9.7  10.6  12.0  18.5  18.5  20.5  23.2 
Portugal  23.9  21.0  21.9  23.2  15.3  14.3  15.9  17.5  39.2  35.3  37.8  40.6 
Spain  10.5  10.0  11.7  12.6  7.8  8.4  10.2  11.1  18.4  18.4  22.0  23.7 
Belgium/ 
Luxembourg  40.1  36.9  37.5  39.1  40.2  39.7  41.1  41.0  80.3  76.6  78.6  80.1 
Denmark  15.4  14.1  14.7  15.9  17.3  15.6  15.4  15.7  32.7  29.7  30.0  31.6 
FR. Germany  12.0  9.8  10.1  10.7  13.4  11.4  11.8  12.4  25.5  21.2  21.9  23.1 
France  11.1  9.7  10.5  11.2  11.2  10.0  10.9  11.6  22.3  19.7  21.4  22.8 
Ireland  28.9  25.5  27.3  27.3  40.7  41.2  45.4  47.6  69.6  66.7  72.7  74.9 
Netherlands  27.1  21.7  23.2  23.4  30.9  28.3  29.5  30.5  58.0  49.9  52.7  53.9 
Austria  20.0  18.1  18.9  20.2  15.9  14.2  14.6  15.6  35.8  32.3  33.5  35.7 
Finland  11.5  11.9  12.7  7.9  14.4  15.6  16.8  10.5  25.9  27.5  29.6  18.5 
Sweden  12.3  13.4  15.1  17.2  13.6  14.8  15.9  18.3  25.9  28.2  31.0  35.4 
United Kingdom  11.7  10.5  11.8  12.7  10.6  9.6  11.0  12.2  22.4  20.1  22.8  24.9 
Source: own calculations based on AMECO database. 
Another indicator, trade with EU15 as % of total trade presented in table 3.3 examines to what 
extent countries are exposed to the effects of volatility of the common currency, i.e. it measures 
vulnerability to shocks from the third countries (see Bratkowski and Rostowski, 2001). For most 
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 Considering that some new members aspire to join the Euro-zone in 2006 or 2007 comparing their current 
performance to that of Club Med in the early 1990s makes a lot of sense.   
                                       Studies & Analyses   No. 267 – Monika Błaszkiewicz, Przemysław Wozniak 
21 
accession countries, the exposition of extra-EU trade is in the range of that of the EU countries. 
The share of exports going to EU15 was about 60-70% of total exports in 2002 (with the exception 
of Lithuania’s 48% and Cyprus’ 50%) which is very much in line with the EU15 average of 60%. 
Thus, one can conclude that the exposure of the accession countries (as well as Bulgaria and 
Romania) to Euro volatility is not particularly different from that of the EU itself . 
Table 3.3 Trade with EU as % of total trade, 1999-2002 
Trade with EU - 15 as % of total trade 
1999  2000  2001  2002  1999  2000  2001  2002  1999  2000  2001  2002  Country 
Imports  Exports  Imports + Exports 
Bulgaria  48.4  44.0  49.3  49.7  52.1  51.3  54.7  54.7  50.0  47.1  51.6  51.8 
Romania  60.7  56.6  57.3  58.4  65.5  63.8  67.8  67.1  49.9  48.6  48.3  52.6 
Cyprus  52.6  51.6  50.8  53.0  40.0  36.4  38.3  50.7  66.6  65.2  65.2  64.0 
Czech Republic  64.2  62.1  61.8  60.1  69.2  68.7  68.9  68.1  68.2  68.6  62.1  62.0 
Estonia  65.3  62.6  56.5  57.8  72.5  76.5  69.5  67.9  70.0  66.3  65.6  65.2 
Hungary  64.4  58.5  57.8  56.3  76.2  75.2  74.3  75.1  57.5  57.0  55.7  55.6 
Latvia  54.5  52.5  52.6  52.9  62.5  64.6  61.2  60.4  47.9  45.2  45.6  46.1 
Lithuania  46.5  43.3  44.0  44.5  50.1  47.9  47.8  48.3  67.0  64.6  64.7  64.7 
Poland  65.0  61.2  61.4  61.7  70.5  70.0  69.2  68.7  62.8  59.8  61.8  62.2 
Slovenia  68.9  67.8  67.6  68.0  66.1  63.9  62.2  59.3  67.6  66.0  65.1  63.7 
Slovak Republic  51.7  48.9  49.7  50.3  59.4  59.1  59.9  60.4  55.3  53.8  54.4  55.0 
EU-15  59.4  56.4  56.6  57.0  62.2  60.8  60.7  60.5  60.8  58.6  58.7  58.7 
Belgium/ 
Luxembourg  71.1  69.4  70.2  70.8  76.7  74.5  75.4  76.0  74.0  72.0  72.9  73.5 
Denmark  71.3  69.0  69.3  69.0  61.6  60.7  59.5  58.3  66.2  64.6  64.1  63.3 
 Germany  52.9  51.8  52.3  52.6  56.2  56.5  55.4  55.0  54.7  54.3  54.0  53.9 
Greece  66.7  56.4  56.5  57.8  53.8  43.8  45.6  45.7  63.3  53.0  53.7  54.6 
Spain  67.3  63.1  63.4  63.5  71.5  69.7  70.3  70.3  69.1  65.9  66.4  66.5 
France  61.6  58.5  58.4  57.7  64.2  62.4  62.3  62.4  62.9  60.4  60.3  60.1 
Ireland  54.0  53.5  57.7  56.0  64.9  61.7  61.5  61.7  60.6  58.4  60.1  59.6 
Italy  61.1  55.8  56.1  55.9  57.8  54.5  53.3  52.3  59.4  55.1  54.7  54.1 
Netherlands  53.5  49.0  47.0  47.0  72.5  70.9  73.1  72.9  63.0  60.1  60.3  60.3 
Austria  70.3  67.7  66.9  67.4  64.4  63.0  62.7  62.1  67.5  65.5  64.9  64.7 
Portugal  78.1  75.1  75.1  76.9  83.2  80.3  80.1  79.6  80.1  77.1  77.0  78.0 
Finland  55.7  52.1  53.3  53.2  55.5  53.8  51.9  52.1  55.6  53.1  52.5  52.6 
Sweden  68.3  65.0  65.2  65.3  57.5  54.6  54.8  54.8  62.5  59.4  59.6  59.6 
United Kingdom  51.4  48.4  49.0  50.7  55.2  54.5  54.9  55.4  53.2  51.2  51.6  52.8 
Source: CANSTAT – Candidate Countries Statistical Bulletin www.insse.ro/canstat_Q1/canstat.htm and EUROSTAT  
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The  overall  impression  is  that  the  accession  countries  as  well  as  the  candidate  countries 
(Bulgaria and Romania) have successfully re-oriented their economies towards the EU markets. 
On average, their exports to EU15 account now for a much higher percent of GDP than was the 
case with the Club Med countries in the first half of  the 1990s when they were preparing to join the 
Euro-zone. Moreover, during recent years this indicator for all 8 post-socialist economies has been 
higher than for many current Euro-zone members. Therefore as far as the importance of trade with 
EU  is  concerned,  accession  countries  score  very  well  and–according  to  this  standard  OCA 
criterion- are expected to benefit greatly from joining the EMU. 
3.2  Correlation of business cycles 
Correlation  of  real  growth  rates,  growth  rates  of  industrial  output  and  changes  in 
unemployment are supposed to measure the extent to which real activity in individual countries 
moves  together  with  the  EU  aggregate.  Close  (positive  and  close  to  unity)  correlations  are 
interpreted as an indicator of the symmetry of shocks and hence as a sign in favor of adopting the 
euro. To check robustness of results correlations will be measured at both annual and quarterly 
frequencies 
It has to be mentioned that such correlations (quite like more advanced techniques of detecting 
co-movements in the real sphere such as VARs), although often found in the literature, should be 
examined with the highest caution in the case of transition economies. This increased caution 
concerns  the  problem  with  interpreting  real  GDP  movements  in  post-socialist  economies  as 
business cycles. The shock related to transition from a plan to a market economy started for most 
investigated countries in early 1990s, but it continues to be a subject of debate when it ceased to 
dominate the developments of macroeconomic series. While this is very difficult to establish, one 
can be sure, that the data from the first half of 1990s carry very little information about the cycle 
(GDP, industrial production) or fundamental changes in the labor market (unemployment rate). 
They contain a great deal of noise related to structural changes in those economies, frequent 
changes in the law as well as purely methodological modifications of the way economic time series 
were defined and calculated. On the other hand, the more one moves towards the end of the 
1990s
11
, the more confident one can be that the effect of the transition shock becomes negligible 
and the data series contain a more credible and trustworthy information. Hence, in this study, we 
put a lot of effort to work on the most recent data and offer results calculated with many alternative 
time periods. 
 Correlation at annual frequency 
Table 3.4 presents correlation coefficients between real growth rates of the Euro zone and 
respective countries during the periods 1994-2002 and 1991-1995 (for Club Med). For the period 
                                                  
11
 It is, however, very difficult to say precisely when this period starts for particular countries.   
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1994-2002, several sub-periods were checked in order to examine the sensitivity of results. The 
end of the sample was held constant at 2002 while the beginning was shifted forwards stepwise  
Table 3.4 Correlation between annual real growth rates in the Euro-zone and respective countries 
Correlation between annual real growth rates 

















Bulgaria    0.25  0.24  0.24  -0.05  0.09  0.10 
Romania    -0.46  -0.52  -0.63  -0.58  -0.68  -0.76 
Turkey    -0.06  0.04  0.03  0.14  0.12  0.08 
Cyprus    0.67  0.66  0.76  0.73  0.91  0.90 
Czech Republic    -0.25  -0.26  -0.38  -0.24  -0.24  0.01 
Estonia    -0.12  0.02  0.03  -0.03  -0.10  -0.12 
Hungary    0.52  0.58  0.74  0.95  0.95  0.96 
Latvia    -0.16  -0.08  -0.06  -0.25  -0.35  -0.29 
Lithuania    -0.38  -0.36  -0.36  -0.36  -0.42  -0.53 
Malta    0.60  0.58  0.62  0.70  0.71  0.73 
Poland    0.44  0.43  0.46  0.69  0.90  0.93 
Slovakia    -0.34  -0.40  -0.50  -0.40  -0.62  -0.86 
Slovenia    0.78  0.80  0.80  0.80  0.81  0.87 
13 Candidate countries*    0.02  0.13  0.12  0.27  0.27  0.24 
10 Acceding countries*    0.42  0.41  0.46  0.72  0.94  0.94 
Greece  0.99  -0.03  0.10  0.19  -0.26  -0.25  -0.03 
Italy  0.95  0.78  0.77  0.85  0.83  0.83  0.87 
Portugal  0.84  0.55  0.77  0.79  0.90  0.92  0.96 
Spain  0.97  0.76  0.91  0.95  0.95  0.96  0.97 
Belgium    0.88  0.87  0.87  0.86  0.93  0.98 
Denmark    0.53  0.75  0.76  0.87  0.96  0.95 
Germany    0.98  0.98  0.99  0.99  0.99  1.00 
France    0.85  0.89  0.93  0.93  1.00  1.00 
Ireland    0.58  0.79  0.79  0.81  0.87  0.88 
Luxembourg    0.81  0.84  0.94  0.95  0.99  0.99 
Netherlands    0.77  0.81  0.81  0.88  0.90  0.92 
Austria    0.82  0.81  0.84  0.87  0.91  0.95 
Finland    0.72  0.73  0.73  0.79  0.92  0.91 
Sweden    0.85  0.84  0.87  0.85  0.89  0.89 
United Kingdom    0.60  0.73  0.73  0.77  0.95  0.96 
* - Weighted mean of t/t-1 national growth rates (weights: gdp in t-1 in current prices in ECU/EUR) 
Source: own calculations based on AMECO database. 
from 1994 to 1999 resulting in time series of 9-4 observations. Such an analysis allows us to 
check whether the patterns of the investigated indicator is changing over time. In the case of the  
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real  growth  rates  correlation,  we  expect  the  postulated  correlation  to  be  stronger  for  periods 
starting in the late 1990s rather than in the mid-1990s. This is mostly due to the transition shock 
that for most accession countries was still very visible in the mid-1990s and only began to wear off 
towards the end of the decade. The analogous correlation coefficients for the Club Med countries 
during the 1991-1995 will be used as a benchmark. 
Unlike in the case of the EU exports, real growth rates correlation seems to be smaller for the 
candidate countries than for the EU members. While for EU members (except for Greece) these 
coefficients  are  all  well  above  0.5
12
,  respective  figures  for  acceding  countries  are  extremely 
dispersed and often take on negative values. Real growth rates in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Latvia  and  Lithuania  exhibit  consistently  negative  correlation  with  the  Euro-zone  growth  rates, 
while  those  for  Estonia  are  close  to  zero.  High  positive  correlation  was  detected  for  Poland, 
Hungary, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus. For these countries, it is also very visible that the correlation 
gets stronger as we move the starting data of the sample forward. This indicates that the process 
of convergence is taking place and that the paths of GDP growth in these countries are moving 
closer and closer to those of the EU.  
Comparison with the coefficients calculated for Club Med during 1991-1995 (all of which are 
very high) suggests that acceding countries are much more diverse and are still subject to many 
idiosyncratic shocks. However, the aggregate real GDP growth rate for all acceding countries has 
exhibited  a  rather  high  correlation  with  the  euro  zone  GDP  growth  rate
13
.  Nonetheless,  big 
differences in individual growth rates correlation point to lack of homogeneity of the acceding group 
commonly thought to be rather homogenous. 
The following table, table 3.5 presents correlation coefficients calculated in an analogous way 
between the annual change of unemployment rates in the Euro-zone and respective countries. 
Much in line with previous findings, relatively high correlation between changes in unemployment 
in the Eurozone and in the Eurozone members (with the exception of Greece and Denmark) is 
coupled  with  very  strange  patterns  of  correlation  among  accession  countries.  Relatively  high 
positive correlation is detected for Hungary, Slovenia and Latvia while for the rest of the countries, 
correlation rates are very often negative and close to –1 (Lithuania, Estonia and Poland). This is 
very  much  in  contrast  with  correlation  of  unemployment  rate  changes  for  Club  Med  countries 
during 1989-1994, all of which are positive and very high. 
Moreover, unemployment rate correlation coefficients for accession countries do not coincide 
well with those of the real growth rate presented in table 3.4 This is a clear indication of problems 
that  have  to  be  dealt  with  when  examining  unemployment  rates  in  transition  economies. 
Fundamental structural changes, changing laws related to the legal status of the unemployment 
benefits  and  the  evolution  of  a  welfare  state,  all  result  in  a  lack  of  correlation  between 
                                                  
12
 High correlation between growth rates of the Eurozone and its members is to some extent a result of the fact the 
aggregate figure is a weighted average of individual member GDP growth rates.  
13
 The aggregate growth rate is an average of national growth rates weighted by previous-period national GDPs 
denominated in €/ECU. Therefore, big countries, like Poland and Hungary characterized by high correlation rates, have 
influenced the index to a big extent and decided on its high value.  
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unemployment changes with changes in real activity. Therefore, even though correlation between 
unemployment  rate  changes  is  a  standard  criterion  used  in  the  literature  to  gauge  the 
appropriateness of a country joining a  
Table 3.5 Correlation between annual change in unemployment rates in the Euro-zone  
and respective countries 
Correlation between annual change in unemployment rates in the Euro-zone 
and respective countries 
during:  Country 
1989-1994*  1994-2002  1995-2002  1996-2002  1997-2002  1998-2002  1999-2002 
Bulgaria              -0.89 
Romania            -0.23  -0.28 
Turkey    -0.01  0.11  0.16  0.53  0.69  0.69 
Czech Republic    -0.49  -0.52  -0.51  -0.47  -0.59  -0.60 
Estonia    -0.39  -0.62  -0.72  -0.86  -0.95  -0.95 
Hungary    0.16  0.69  0.70  0.69  0.74  0.76 
Latvia    0.2  0.1  0.15  0.23  0.39  0.40 
Lithuania    -0.39  -0.62  -0.72  -0.86  -0.95  -0.79 
Poland    -0.50  -0.60  -0.62  -0.51  -0.32  -0.94 
Slovakia    -0.53  -0.11  -0.06  -0.02  -0.59  -0.92 
Slovenia    0.45  0.55  0.41  0.42  0.40  0.68 
Greece  0.73  -0.01  -0.08  -0.09  -0.20  -0.27  -0.26 
Italy  0.89  0.65  0.44  0.47  0.37  0.18  0.44 
Portugal  0.87  0.74  0.60  0.60  0.60  0.71  0.98 
Spain  0.97  0.87  0.79  0.79  0.83  0.91  0.93 
Belgium    0.82  0.71  0.70  0.75  0.82  0.90 
Denmark    -0.53  -0.11  -0.06  -0.02  0.87  0.90 
Germany    0.83  0.88  0.91  0.88  0.95  0.97 
France    0.91  0.89  0.91  0.89  0.87  0.93 
Ireland    0.40  0.53  0.59  0.57  0.78  0.91 
Luxembourg    0.74  0.54  0.61  0.63  0.82  0.85 
Netherlands    0.58  0.29  0.28  0.34  0.72  0.94 
Austria    0.51  0.85  0.85  0.82  0.90  0.93 
Finland    0.43  0.10  0.12  0.10  0.63  0.70 
Sweden    0.85  0.87  0.88  0.84  0.82  0.93 
United Kingdom    -0.10  0.06  0.11  0.14  0.78  0.93 
* for the period 1989-1994, Eurozone including West Germany. 
Source: own calculations based on AMECO database. 
currency  area,  in  the  case  of  new  accession  countries,  most  of  which  are  former  post-
communist  economies  still  undergoing  many  structural  changes,  these  correlations  need  to  be 
taken with the highest caution. As a consequence, the ability to infer much about the fitness of 
accession countries to join the EMU, is rather limited. On the other hand, low, and in many cases  
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negative  correlation  coefficients  point  to  potential  problems  and  indicate  that  real  economic 
developments  in  acceding  countries,  as  measured  by  changes  in  unemployment  rates,  might 
deviate significantly from those in the Euro-zone. 
Correlation at a quarterly frequency 
Another approach to measuring the above correlations is to use data of higher frequency in 
order  to  detect  short-term  co-linearity  of  real  sector  developments.  Instead  of  using  annual 
averages of unemployment rates and real GDP growth rates, we will now use quarterly values of 
these growth rates. This yields 4 data points for each year and enables to better track down short-
term co-movements in key variables during more recent time periods. In addition to real growth 
rates and unemployment rate changes, we analyze growth rates of indices of industrial production. 
Real GDP and industrial production are average annual growth rates during a particular quarter, 
while  changes  in  unemployment  rates  during  a  particular  quarter  are  defined  as  average 
unemployment rate during this quarter minus an analogous value during the same quarter of the 
preceding year. To check the sensitivity of results to changing the sample period, correlations were 
calculated for periods 1999Q1-2003Q2 (18 observations), 2000Q1-2003Q2 (14 observations) and 
2001Q1-2003Q2 (10 observations). Resulting correlation coefficients are presented in table 3.5. In 
addition to accession countries coefficients were calculated for Bulgaria and Romania as well as 
selected Euro-zone countries. Additionally, for comparison, the lower panel of the table contains 
analogous figures for Club Med countries during the period preceding their joining the Eurozone, 
i.e. 1990Q1-1995Q4. 
Short-term  correlations  reveal  yet  another  side  of  output  co-movements  between  EU  and 
accession  countries.  There  are  2  countries  that  score  very  high  at  both  annual  and  quarterly 
correlations:  Hungary  and  Slovenia.  Poland  and  Slovakia  exhibit  high  correlation  for  industrial 
production but rather chaotic and negative correlation in the case of GDP. Coefficients for Latvia 
and Lithuania are very unstable and often negative (exclusively negative for the latter country). 
Czech correlations are positive and high (in contrast to annual correlations). 
In the case of unemployment changes, Latvia, Hungary and Slovenia exhibit high correlation, 
but for the remaining countries correlations are unstable and mostly negative. 
All this is in stark contrast with contemporary correlations of Euro-zone countries, the majority 
of which exhibit high and positive coefficients. Exceptions to this rule are Greece (GDP) as well as 
Italy and France (unemployment rate). Correlations between indicators of Club Med countries and 
Germany
14
 in the early 1990s point to much closer links in the real economy than those detected 
for accession countries. For all 4 countries, both GDP and industrial production moved in line with 
the German one and correlation coefficients usually exceeded 0.5. Especially when the sample 
period is shortened, i.e. contains 3-4 years before the Club Med countries joined the ERM, the 
correlation in both indicators jumps to near-1  for most countries.  
                                                  
14
 Because of unavailability of quarterly data for early 1990s, data for Euro-zone were replaced by data for Germany 
– by far the biggest and most dominant member of the Euro-zone.   
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Summing up, it has to be mentioned that unlike shares of EU exports in GDP, that undoubtedly 
place accession countries in the Euro area, correlation in output and unemployment movements 
provide a mixed picture. Checked both at annual and quarterly frequency for various sample   
Table 3.6 Correlation  of business cycles at quarterly frequency 
  Correlation between the Euro zone and respective countries 
Annual Real GDP growth  Annual growth of industrial 
production index 





















Bulgaria  0.17  0.38  -0.23  0.42  0.60  0.67  -0.76  -0.82  -0.74 
Romania  -0.52  -0.75  0.16  0.16  0.28  0.42  -0.38  -0.19  -0.06 
Czech 
Republic  0.21  0.63  0.57  0.21  0.37  0.80  -0.38  -0.06  0.30 
Estonia  0.04  0.47  0.08  0.46  0.70  0.38  -0.68  -0.60  -0.21 
Hungary  0.48  0.47  0.89  0.90  0.91  0.82  0.83  0.84  0.89 
Latvia  -0.03  0.14  0.65  0.01  -0.23  0.52  0.70  0.71  0.43 
Lithuania  -0.55  -0.65  -0.15  -0.21  -0.26  -0.02  -0.77  -0.86  -0.82 
Poland  -0.38  -0.49  0.14  0.78  0.83  0.79  -0.72  -0.72  -0.79 
Slovenia  0.52  0.64  0.30  0.55  0.67  0.35  0.32  0.39  0.24 
Slovakia  -0.74  -0.85  -0.38  0.28  0.51  0.67  -0.40  -0.14  0.01 
Germany  0.96  0.96  0.97  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.90  0.95  0.93 
France  0.80  0.95  0.90  0.90  0.91  0.79  -0.41  -0.32  -0.47 
Portugal  0.59  0.75  0.55  0.06  0.03  0.38  0.97  0.92  0.87 
Spain  0.73  0.83  0.69  0.77  0.79  0.56  0.66  0.58  0.42 
Greece  -0.04  -0.01  -0.36  0.67  0.83  0.61  0.29  0.16  0.11 
Italy  0.93  0.96  0.92  0.96  0.97  0.97  -0.48  -0.44  -0.72 
Finland  0.77  0.85  0.45  0.90  0.94  0.88  0.91  0.85  0.74 
Sweden  0.77  0.79  0.22  0.90  0.92  0.79  0.96  0.93  0.98 
Correlation between Germany and respective club med countries 
Annual Real GDP growth 
 



















Greece  0.60  0.70  0.86  0.94    0.07  0.27  0.55  0.57 
Italy  0.22  0.23  0.75  0.90    0.39  0.67  0.82  0.89 
Portugal  0.48  0.46  0.91  0.95    0.68  0.55  0.53  0.51 
Spain  0.49  0.48  0.80  0.93    0.66  0.81  0.91  0.98 
Source: own calculations based on CANSTAT (candidate and accession countries) IFS and websites of central banks 
and statistical offices of respective countries. 
periods, these correlations point to substantial diversity within the group. The only countries whose 
correlation with the EU is close to that of current EU members are Hungary and Slovenia. For all 
other countries, the evidence for co-movements is very weak and sensitive to the indicator, time 
period  or  frequency  of  data.  This  is  also  the  case  for  Poland,  which  exhibits  high  positive  
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correlation in the case of the average annual GDP and quarterly industrial production, but negative 
in  the  case  of  quarterly  GDP  growth  rates  and  unemployment  rate  (at  both  frequencies).  The 
opposite is the case for the Czech Republic, where positive correlation was found at quarterly 
frequency (except for unemployment rate), and negative for annual data. For Latvia and Lithuania 
(and to a lesser extent Estonia) no robust conclusions can be drawn, as correlation coefficients 
jump up and down chaotically depending on the time period and frequency (and stay negative in 
most  cases).  Correlation  coefficients  for  Slovakia  turn  out  almost  solely  negative,  the  only 
exception being annual industrial production changes measured at quarterly frequency. 
This performance is in stark contrast with performance of the EU members (which is partly to 
be explained by the fact that most of them are members of the Euro zone) but also with the Club 
Med  countries  in  the  first  half  of  the  1990s  before  they  were  admitted  to  the  ERMI  and 
subsequently to the EMU. Thus, traditional OCA indicators of business cycle correlations offer an 
inconclusive  answer  to  the  question  of  compatibility  of  most  EU-acceding  countries  with  the 
exception of Hungary and Slovenia that already exhibit strong and robust correlations.  
However,  as  the  OCA  theory  review  in  the  second  chapter  makes  clear  these  traditional 
indicators have been frequently criticized for being “static” and failing to account for endogeneity of 
business  cycle  indicators.  It  is  argued  that  once  a  country  is  admitted  to  the  currency  area, 
business  cycle  correlations  rise,  shocks  get  more  symmetrical  and  trade  with  the  area  soars 
(evidence for this taking place in CEEC can be found in Fidrmuc, 2001) . Therefore it does not 
make sense to gauge countries’ appropriateness to be admitted to the currency area based on the 
ex-ante values of those indicators. 
On the other hand, even if we accept this criticism of traditional OCA criteria, it still leaves 
room  for  applying  them  in  a  comparative  framework  for  countries  that  were  also  prior  to  their 
accession to the Union. In this paper, this has been done for Club Med countries during the first 
half of the 1990s. Even if one accepts that the computed indicators are in fact endogenous and 
would all improve in the wake of joining the Euro zone, it still makes sense to assume that the 
higher they are prior to joining, the higher they will be after the joining. Consequently, examining 
those indicators prior to adopting the euro gives a good estimate of where accession countries are 
now and where they could be should they become a part of the Euro zone. 
4  Exchange rate variability approach to OCA  
This chapter presents empirical application of another OCA approach in literature, i.e. that 
investigating  real  exchange  rate  volatility  to  measure  the  extent  of  shock  asymmetry  and  thus 
coherence with the currency area. This approach has not been applied very often so far, but in our 
opinion constitutes a very straightforward and comprehensive way of assessing the real impact 
coming from idiosyncratic shocks.   
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4.1  Asymmetric shocks and other issues 
The traditional OCA theory implies that if asymmetric shocks are present, then - in the light of 
some  nominal  wage-price  stickiness  -  fixed  nominal  exchange  rates  will  enhance  the  costs 
associated  with  forming  a  monetary  union  (i.e.  it  won’t  be  possible  to  stabilize  real  domestic 
demand shocks). If exchange rates between two countries are stable, then the costs for these 
countries of giving up their own currencies (and consequently an independent monetary policy) will 
be lower. Of course, a flexible nominal exchange rate is not the only policy tool authorities have at 
hand  to  minimize  the  impact  of  asymmetric  shocks  on  real  exchange  rate  movements. 
Unfortunately,  for  a  number  of  various  reasons  (such  as  sticky  prices  and  wages,  rigid  labor 
markets, political cycles, etc) the alternative tools cannot be used immediately. Therefore, nominal 
exchange rate often serves as a stabilizing instrument. 
By assuming the beneficial role of the exchange rate as a useful stabilization tool, we adopt 
the  early  Mundell  (1961)  reasoning.  One  can  argue  (in  line  with  McKinnon,  2000)  that  if 
macroeconomic shocks were themselves induced by poor policies, creating a currency area with 
another country or a group of countries would minimize those shocks. Nevertheless, the more 
similar the structures of economies wishing to formulate a currency union, the lower the likelihood 
that common shocks will have asymmetric rather than symmetric effects.   
Given the assumed importance exchange rate plays in cushioning real and financial shocks, 
the empirical implementation of the OCA theory adopted in this paper concentrates on estimates of 
variation  of  exchange  rates  in  CEE  candidate  countries.  The  choice  of  this  methodology  –  as 
described in the literature review - is governed by the fact that exchange rate variability seems to 
be the most comprehensive way of assessing whether joining the currency union will be more or 
less attractive than retaining the status quo. This is chiefly because it allows for incorporating other 
factors recognized as important for the creation of an optimal currency area (for example, factor 
mobility, the degree of market diversification, fiscal integration, degree of openness, etc). 
Nevertheless, it has its disadvantages too. For example, the variance approach ignores the 
fact that exchange rate fluctuations are caused by a variety of factors, making it difficult to isolate 
effects of a particular event; it does not allow for separating out changes in real exchange rate 
caused by nominal factors, such as financial market movements from movements caused by real 
factors, such as increased degree of openness. As shocks to domestic money supply are short 
lasting and can actually be better tuned once a monetary union is created, this concern should not 
be ignored.  
Another criticism of the approach is that the methodology ignores the fact that, for example, 
currency boards with an anchor different than the Euro naturally exhibit higher fluctuations of the 
euro exchange rate. This would be an important limitation in the context of our study since some 
accession countries have adopted currency boards anchored to USD or SDR while the others to 
DM. However, we argue that all accession countries, but Latvia either already have euro-based  
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currency boards or euro-dominated reference baskets (see Table 4.1 below)
 15
. Moreover, in order 
to be admitted to the EMU, Latvia, as all accession countries, must limit fluctuations of its national 
currency  against  the Euro  (+/-  15%  around  the  central  parity)  and  hence  we  are  interested  in 
fluctuations of NER against the Euro and not the USD or any other currency. Also, in our analysis 
we attempt to investigate to what extend nominal exchange rate plays a role in adjusting real 
exchange rate between regions (i.e., CEECs and EMU Member States) exposed to asymmetric 
shocks.  
Table 4.1. Weight of EMU currencies/ euro in the currency basket
1 
Source: Egert and Kierzenkowski (2003) 
 
These  caveats  notwithstanding,  we  think  that  the  analysis  of  real  exchange  rate  variability 
should give a more complex and complete insight into the issue of cycle-co-movements than would 
any  static  indicator  or  VAR-based  methods.  Instead  of  concentrating  on  potential  sources  of 
asymmetric shocks or restricting them to a one-variable level, the variability approach involves 
looking at the behavior of the exchange rate which is assumed to ultimately reflect adjustments to 
shocks. In this context, static methods seem rather primitive as they are bound to provide a very 
fragmented picture of macroeconomic conditions underlying the decision of joining the currency 
union. Moreover, their investigation ex ante risks being charged with the ‘Lucas critique’.          
Then again, VAR approach is commonly criticized for its restrictiveness (see the comments in 
section 2.3) that is especially problematic in the context of transition economies. Furthermore, any 
econometric estimation which uses data on transition countries (and VARs specifically) always 
involves  a  painful  trade-off  between  the  wish  to  work  with  the  trustworthy  dataset  (and  thus 
dropping  observations  from  early  stages  of  a  transition  period)  and  the  wish  to  improve  the 
econometric aspects of estimation (and thus maximally extending the sample period to the past). 
The additional reason why we decided not to estimate a VAR model in this paper is that on one 
hand there are relatively many studies of this kind carried out for the CEECs (most of them are 
                                                  
15
 The notable exception is Latvia, which has a SDR-based currency board (informally, formally, Latvia follows fixed 
but adjustable peg). Nevertheless, the structure of the economy is much more similar to that of other CEECs and it 
already has tight economic linkages with the EU member states. Moreover, the fact that Latvia pegs to a currency basket 
like SDR can mitigate impacts of exchange rate fluctuations among major international currencies.  
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reviewed in section 2.3). On the other hand, there is a very limited number of papers where the 
variance approach has been applied.  
Nominal Exchange Rate Variability 
As  already  pointed  out,  financial  shocks  can  be  better  tackled  once  a  monetary  union  is 
actually created. This is because a single currency minimizes impediments to money flows across 
national  borders  (European  Parliament,  1998).  From  this  perspective  and  given  that  candidate 
countries are going to face increased net capital flows (i.e., structural funds), giving up national 
currencies should reduce the distress related to nominal exchange rate movements. However, 
given market rigidities, it is often the nominal exchange rate that adjusts in response to required 
changes in the real exchange rate. A stable nominal exchange rate is not only a pre-requisite for 
minimizing costs  of  formulating  a  common currency  area;  it  is  also  required  by  the  Maastricht 
Treaty.  
Figure 4.1 NER volatility: distance from the Club Med average (1996-1998) 
Source: own calculation based on IMF IFS and ECB data. 
Figure 4.1 sets out a measure of nominal exchange rate (NER) stability for CEEC countries in 
terms  of  the  difference  between  the  average  (2000-2002/03)  NER  volatility  calculated  for  the 
respective candidate country vis-à-vis the euro and the average volatility of a ClubMed country vis-
à-vis the euro over three years preceding the introduction of the common currency (1996-1998). 
Nominal exchange rate volatility in the CEECs was calculated over the three-year period (July 
2000 to August 2003) and was defined (in line with Gurjarati, 2003) as a mean of the squared 
deviation of the first difference of the logged nominal exchange rate from its mean. The volatility of 
the ClubMed countries’ exchange rates was calculated over the period 1996-1998 (January 1996 
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In all cases except for Bulgaria, Estonia and Slovenia, the differences in volatility are positive, 
indicating that candidate countries have more volatile nominal exchange rates than the ‘periphery’ 
EU members. Not surprisingly, Bulgaria and Estonia, countries with currency board arrangements 
(CBAs), have more stable nominal exchange rates relative to the ClubMed average. The stability of 
the  Slovenian  currency  is  clear,  despite  its  de  jure  managed  float  regime;  it  exhibits  negative 
differences in volatility. Among countries which still have volatile exchange rates, the country with 
the smaller distance from the ClubMed average is the Czech Republic, followed by the Slovak 
Republic, Latvia and Hungary
16
. Poland, Romania and Lithuania exhibit the most volatile nominal 
exchange rates
17
. Fluctuations of the Lithuanian exchange rate – despite its CBA – are explained 
by the fact that up to February 2, 2002, the currency was anchored to the US dollar and not the 
Euro (see also Appendix 1). 
However, given that the two-year window for ERM participation for past candidates covers the 
period from March 1996 to February 1998, one can argue that for comparative analysis the early 1990s 
should rather be used as a reference point. Assuming that CEECs will join ERM II immediately after the 
accession to the EU (as most of them declare now), the period 2000-2002/3 represents approximately 
the same stage in the accession process as 1993-1995 for the ClubMed countries. 
Figure 4.2 presents the difference between the average exchange rate volatility for CEECs 
(calculated as above) and the average volatility of ClubMed countries between 1993 and 1995 
instead of between 1996 and 1998. The results are striking:  
Figure 4.2 NER volatility: distance from the ClubMed average (1993-1995) 
Source: own calculation based on IMF IFS and ECB data. 
                                                  
 
16 The recent devaluation of the central parity of the Hungarian Forint contributed significantly to its volatility. When 
we exclude 2003 from our analysis, the distance from the ClubMed average is the same as that of the Czech Republic.  
17
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Now, only in the case of Poland, Romania and Lithuania exchange rates are significantly 
more volatile than the ClubMed average (i.e., have a distance greater or close to one). Countries 
like the Czech and Slovak Republics appeared on the other side of the scale; the distances for 
Hungary and Latvia are close to zero.  
In  conclusion,  although  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries  still  have  quite  volatile 
exchange rates when compared with the ClubMed average of 1996-1998, this does not appear to 
be the case when compared with the 1993-1995 average. Clearly, there are three countries which 
outscore  and  two  countries  which  underscore  the  rest  of  the  sample  as  well  as  the  ClubMed 
average (irrespective of the comparable point in time). These are, respectively, Bulgaria, Estonia 
and  Slovenia;  and  Poland  and  Romania
18
.  However,  the  stability  of  Bulgarian  and  Estonian 
nominal exchange rate is not surprising given their currency board arrangements. 
4.2  Empirical Analysis of Real Exchange Rate Movements 
Now,  we  turn  to  the  central  part  of  our  analysis,  which  focuses  on  real  exchange  rate 
fluctuations.  In  order  to  distinguish  between  real  and  nominal  shocks,  we  work  with  different 
frequencies (i.e., monthly and quarterly data)
19
. We make a crucial assumption (in line with von 
Hagen  et  al.,  1994)  that  high-frequency  RER  changes  mostly  reflect  nominal  shocks  and  low-
frequency  RER  changes  are  principally  due  to  real  shocks.  This  distinction  is  the  basis  for 
evaluating the differences between asymmetric real and nominal RER shocks. Likewise, since the 
real variability is influenced by nominal variability, by working with different frequencies, we try to 
tackle the problem of the inability to distinguish between them which is the frequently criticized 
shortcoming of the variance approach to assessing costs criteria from OCA theory. 
Methodology 
Building  on  the  findings  set  out  above,  we  estimate  unexpected  (i.e.,  conditional)  real 
exchange  rate  variances  between  respective  candidate  countries  and  the  European  Monetary 
Union (EMU) members treated as a group (i.e., real exchange rates were deflated by the ratio of 
prices between a particular accession country and the euro area HICP inflation)
20
. This approach 
draws on Vaubel (1976) and is similar to that of von Hagen, et al., 1994 and Gros, et al., 2003
21
. 
Given  that  the  aim  of  the  paper  is  mainly  to  address  the  question  of  whether  the  new 
accession wave could benefit from adopting the euro (based on the OCA cost-benefit analysis), the 
choice of the reference group seems to be appropriate.  
                                                  
18
 Again, the case of Lithuania is slightly peculiar due to the change in the anchor currency. 
19 RER indexes as well as conditional variances for quarterly and monthly data were estimated with the use of the 
same definitions. 
20
 The sample included Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Even if Bulgaria and Romania are still lagging behind and are not included in the first 
wave of an acceding group, for comparative reasons they were also included in the sample.  
21
 Gros et al., 2003, however, look at observed rather than unexpected exchange rate variability.   
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To facilitate assessments of the magnitude of these RER variances (i.e., to decide when the 
variance should be considered large and when - small) estimates of the observed RER volatility of 
selected  current  EMU  members  are  also  provided
22
.  Since  looking  at  the  historical  euro  real 
exchange  rate  volatility  (i.e.,  prior  to  the  actual  creation  of  the  union)  might  be  considered 
questionable, we allow for various sensitivity checks. For example, we also look at real exchange 
rate volatility between a particular member state and Germany (i.e., the ‘core’ EU member) as well 
as at price differentials.   
Sample and Data 
In order to distinguish between different exchange rate regimes, as well as to separate out the 
early stages of the transition period, we divide our sample into three parts: the mid-transition period 
of 1993-95; the late transition of 1996-99; and the pre-accession period of 1999-02/03. These sub-
samples more or less correspond to steps taken by some Central and Eastern European countries 
tin their movement towards more flexible regimes (see Egert and Kierzenkowski (2003)). The fact 
that respective CEE countries represent a broad range of exchange rate regimes allows us to 
comment on the impact of those arrangements on real exchange rate volatility. For example, we 
ask if Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have necessarily less volatile real exchange rates 
than Poland, the Czech Republic or Romania. 
From the perspective of the Club Med countries, as well as France and Germany, the choice of 
the  sample  period  was  governed  by  two  factors.  Firstly,  1993  marks  an  end  of  the  EMS  and 
therefore  allows  for  nominal  exchange  rates  fluctuation  within  a  band  of  +/-15  percent.  This 
ensures  minimum  policy  coordination  between  countries  and  is  important  for  comparative 
purposes. Secondly, the fact that we also look at past data exchange rate variations and compare 
those with the exchange rate volatility of the current accession wave allows us to address the 
question  of  endogenuity.  For  example,  we  look  at  the  time  period  where  conditions  for  the 
ClubMed  countries  were  not  influenced  by  structural  changes  induced  by  the  creation  of  the 
monetary union itself.  
Data on monthly average nominal exchange rates against the US dollar as well as consumer 
price indices up to August 2003 - for all countries under consideration - come from the IMF IFS. In 
order to calculate exchange rates against the Euro we used the ECB reference Euro/ US Dollar 
exchange  rate  (against  the  ECU  up  to  December  1998).  The  Eurozone  price  index  (HICP)  is 
sourced from the OECD. As this series only starts in 1994, before this date, it was approximated by 
a producer price index for the entire region. 
                                                  
22
 As a benchmark, we looked at RER variances of the ClubMed countries usually considered as a ‘periphery’ as 
well as France and Germany, which belong to the so-called ‘core’ group.  
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Estimation Techniques 
We start our estimation of the conditional standard deviations of RER shocks from computing 
real exchange rates for candidate countries. We first log normalise price and exchange rate indices 
with a common base in 1995:1 and then define log real exchange rate for the accession country i 
as: 
 
RERi,t = log Pt* + log Si,t - log Pi,t   (1) 
 
where Pi,t is price level in the CEE country i at time t, P* refers to the eurozone price level and 
S i,t is the nominal exchange rate at time t between the accession country i and the eurozone (i.e., 
the CEEC currency per euro). An increase in the RER index indicates depreciation.   
For  ClubMed  countries,  as  well  as  for  France  and  Germany,  we  calculated  three  different 
representations of the real exchange rate. First, up to 1998, we used the same definition as for 
accession countries but we also calculated real exchange rates with respect to the German mark 
(i.e., in which case Germany was dropped from the sample)
23
. Since the nominal exchange rate 
between EMU countries equals 1 as of 1999, we also looked at price differentials between those 
countries and eurozone inflation over a full sample (rows marked Union in the tables presented in 
the next section). This provided us with the rough estimate of price convergence after the creation 
of the monetary union. 
Then, we derive the unexpected component of real exchange changes (i.e., fluctuations which 
cannot be explained by past RER movements) for countries of interest by regressing seasonally 




D RER i,t = b1 + b2DRER i,t-1 + b3DRER i,t-2 +……+ b12DRER i,t-12 + ui,t  (2) 
 
Residuals ui,t obtained from these regressions represent conditional real exchange rate shocks 
(see von Hagen, et. al., 1994).  
Later, our analysis involves the standard deviation of these shocks: 
 
s=[var(ui,t )]
1/2    (3) 
 
In  some  cases,  the  best  performing  equations  were  equations  that  not  only  contained 
autoregressive but also a moving average component (ARMA)
25
. 
                                                  
23
 The magnitude of RER volatility for ClubMed countries against the German mark turned to be the same or slightly 
higher from the volatility of RER computed against the ECB reference rate and therefore it won’t be presented here.  
24
 Seasonally adjusted series were obtained as deviations from the 12-month centred moving average. 
25
 In order to choose the appropriate number of lagged terms we applied a ‘general-to-specific’ method of estimation. 
The tests used were LM test for autocorrelation, Q-statistics and Akaike and Schwarz info criteria.   
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Because  the  unexpected  component  in  our  autoregressive  model  (i.e.,  residuals  from  the 
estimated model) is itself a generated regressor (i.e., a deviation from the mean)
26
, we also tried to 
instrument  the  conditional  standard  deviations.  However,  the  performed  Hausman  specification 
error test did not support this method of estimation. 
To  obtain  white-noise  errors  (ui,t)  from  our  model  (see  eq.  2),  where  necessary,  we  used 
dummy variables. Necessarily, this lowered computed standard errors (and hence our measure of 
exchange rate variability). However, events responsible for lack of normality (i.e., financial crises, 
random exchange rate movements, contagion effects from other markets) are generally outliers 
and are unlikely to repeat themselves in the future in any systematic manner.  To some extend, 
therefore,  this  also  corrects  for  the  negative  bias  (i.e.,  bias  due  to  speculative  pressures  or 
irresponsible central bankers) of OCA suitability estimates.   
In order to check whether volatility changes in real exchange rates are significant (i.e., test for 
variance equality between sub-samples), we performed various statistical tests. Von Hagen, et al. 
(1994) propose White’s tests for heteroskedasticity. We additionally carried out an ARCH test, as 
we believe that financial market data often follow an ARCH process. Where it was the case, the 
presented standard errors are errors from a mean equation of an ARCH model
27
.  
Finally, unlike von Hagen, et al., 1994, we do not use interactive dummies on the lag terms 
from the autoregressive model (eq. 2) in order to allow for structural breaks, since we would argue 
that it is inappropriate to pool regressions for which variances are believed to be different (i.e. 
stability tests based on dummy variables or pooled regressions explicitly assume equal variances). 
Therefore, in order to obtain conditional variances, we decided to estimate separate regressions 
for each sub-sample.  
Results 
Table 4. 2. Short-run (monthly data) volatility (candidate countries) 
I  II  III 
White 
Heteroskedasticity  ARCH 
VOLATILITY 
CHANGES 
93-95  96-98  99-03  93-98  96-03  93-98  96-03 
Bulgaria  No*/Yes*  3.502  5.988  1.136  0.171  0.000  0.059  0.000 
Czech Rep.  No/Yes*  0.780  1.444  1.286  0.358  0.021  0.456  0.104 
Estonia  Yes*/Yes*  1.087  0.702  0.493  0.003  0.001  0.099  0.000 
Hungary  Yes/No  1.520  1.001  1.376  0.762  0.492  0.850  0.907 
Latvia  Yes*/No  1.907  0.915  1.607  0.000  0.229  0.013  0.024 
Lithuania  Yes*/No*  2.974  1.697  1.819  0.082  0.059  0.412  0.001 
Poland  Yes*/No*  1.874  1.418  2.206  0.852  0.959  0.034  0.031 
                                                  
26
 See Adrian Pagan's seminal papers on this issue. 
27
 We also performed CUSUM of Squares Test, as this test helps assess not only parameter but also variance 
instability. As the results of the CUSUMSQ test were in line with those obtained by White and ARCH tests they did not 
change our conclusions and therefore won’t be presented here.  
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Romania  Yes*/Yes*  3.924  3.702  2.582  0.954  0.136  0.048  0.019 
Slovak Rep.  No/No*  0.713  1.159  1.677  0.609  0.971  0.814  0.002 
Slovenia  Yes*/Yes*  0.804  0.645  0.372  0.340  0.166  0.000  0.075 
Average    1.908  1.867  1.455         
Note: Yes-convergence, No-divergence, i.e., we observe a decrease/increase in standard deviation of real exchange 
rates between the two tested sub-samples (I-II and II-III); 
 * - Statistically significant changes in standard deviation of real exchange rates between the two sub-samples (based on 
White  Heteroskedasticity  and  Autoregressive  Conditional  Heteroscedastic  (ARCH)  errors  tests  and  10% 
significance  levels).  If  the  null  hypothesis  is  rejected  then  errors  are  heteroskedastic,  i.e.,  the  changes  in 
conditional RER variances between sub-samples are statistically significant. Columns from 6 to 9 report P-values 
of conducted statistical tests.  
 
Source: own calculation based on IMF IFS, OECD and ECB data 
Table  4.2 summarizes  estimates  of  conditional  standard  deviations  (STDs)  of  monthly  real 
exchange rate shocks for 10 candidate countries. Among CEE accession countries, there are 3 
countries  for  which  standard  deviations  of  real  exchange  rate  shocks  exhibit  a  consistent  and 
decreasing trend. This is the case for Estonia, Romania and Slovenia. Moreover, between both 
estimated periods, volatility changes were statistically significant. Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Poland  managed  to  decrease  the  variance  of  RER  shocks  between  the  II  and  I  sub-sample 
(however in Hungary the change was statistically insignificant); in the III sub-sample real exchange 
rates again became more volatile. In Bulgaria there is clear evidence of stabilizing policies between 
1998 and 2002/03. The same is true for the Czech Republic. As for the Slovak Republic, there was 
a continuous increase in RER volatility throughout the whole estimating period.    
If we compare the magnitude of real exchange rate shocks of CEE countries with the ClubMed 
average in the early 1990s as well as in years preceding the creation of the monetary union (see 
Figure  4.3  which  shows  monthly  real  exchange  rates  shocks)  the  results  are  similar. 
Unambiguously,  Slovenia  is  a  leading  example  throughout  the  whole  estimated  period.  The 
average volatility of the Slovenian real exchange rate between 1999 and 2002/03 was 42 per cent 
lower than the average volatility of the ClubMed in years 1996 to 1998 (and as much as 66 per 
cent lower when compared with the 1993-1995 average). In the case of Estonia, it was 23 per cent 
lower (as a percentage of 1993-1995 average it was 55 per cent lower). Other countries with lower 
than  the  ClubMed  average  exchange  rate  variability  are  Bulgaria,  the  Czech  Republic  and 
Hungary. For the rest of the countries the size of exchange rate shocks – even if compared with 










                                                  
28
 See Chart 1 and 2 of Appendix 2.  
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Figure 4.3 Real Exchange Rate Shocks (monthly) 
Source: own calculation based on IMF IFS, ECB and OECD data 
 
On average, the real exchange rate volatility is over two times higher than the real exchange 
rate volatility of ClubMed countries in years preceding EMU membership (i.e. 1996 to 1998) and 
1.3 times higher than the variance of ClubMed countries in the early 1990s
29
.   
Our assessment of the role of different exchange rate regimes for stabilization purposes, as in 
the case of nominal exchange rate volatility, shows that the fact that the 10 candidate countries 
adopted a broad range of different regimes seems not to matter for real exchange rate stability: 
The hypothesis that less flexible regimes contribute to more stable real exchange rates was not 
confirmed by the data (as illustrated by comparisons of Poland and Latvia, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic, Poland and the Czech Republic). This fact can be interpreted as showing that nominal 
exchange rate flexibility is not necessary to accommodate real exchange rate shocks.  
In Table 4.3 we present detailed results for selected EMU member states. The data presented 
here is, as in the case of CEECs, for estimated conditional standard errors of real exchange rates 
shocks.  In  the  same  table,  lines  marked  ‘Union’  are  standard  deviations  of  residuals  from  the 
regressions  (equation  3)  where  real  exchange  rates  were  calculated  with  the  assumption  that 
nominal exchange rates are equal one (i.e., as the price differential between the respective EMU 
member state and the whole currency union). 
The table shows unambiguously that all countries except for Greece intensified their effort in 
lowering RER volatility at the onset of the euro introduction. Moreover, in all countries the reduction 
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in volatility was found to be statistically significant. In all cases except for Spain and Greece, the price 
convergence is less clear. Despite the drop in years 1993 to 1998, it was not statistically significant. 
If  we  compare  the  magnitude  of  conditional  variance  of  price  differentials  with  that  of  real 
exchange rates before the eurozone was actually created, it is clear that the nominal exchange 
rate  played  a  destabilising  rather  than  stabilising  role  in  all  countries  under  consideration. 
Nevertheless, once the union was formed, we fail to report a further price convergence.   
 
Table 4.3. Short-run (monthly data) volatility (member states) 
 
I  II  III 
White 
Heteroskedasticity  ARCH 
VOLATILITY 
CHANGES 
93-95  96-98  99-03  93-98  96-03  93-98  96-03 
Germany  Yes*  0.552  0.319    0.366    0.069   
Union  Yes/No  0.169  0.116  0.141  0.539  0.710  0.638  0.822 
France  Yes*  0.385  0.346    0.331    0.081   
Union  Yes/No  0.145  0.102  0.142  MEAN EQ  0.708  0.326  0.131 
Italy  Yes*  1.721  0.759    0.057    0.158   
Union  Yes/No  0.173  0.151  0.150  0.689  0.517  0.662  0.231 
Greece  No  0.450  0.859    0.954    0.165   
Union  Yes*/ No*  0.380  0.255  0.286  0.736  0.035  0.106  0.098 
Portugal  Yes*  1.066  0.545    0.629    0.026   
Union  Yes/ No  0.270  0.198  0.258  0.534  0.115  0.446  0.579 
Spain  Yes*  1.121  0.383    0.659    0.003   
Union  Yes*/No*  0.143  0.093  0.143  0.004  0.397  0.012  0.080 
Average (ClubMed)  1.089  0.546           
Average (ClubMed; Union)  0.241  0.174  0.209         
Note: Yes-convergence, No-divergence, i.e., we observe a decrease/increase in standard deviation of real exchange 
rates between the two tested sub-samples (I-II and II-III); 
* - Statistically significant changes in standard deviation of real exchange rates between the two sub-samples (based on 
White  Heteroskedasticity  and  Autoregressive  Conditional  Heteroscedastic  (ARCH)  errors  tests  and  10% 
significance  levels).  If  the  null  hypothesis  is  rejected  then  errors  are  heteroskedastic,  i.e.,  the  changes  in 
conditional RER variances between sub-samples are statistically significant. Columns from 6 to 9 report P-values 
of conducted statistical tests.   
Source: own calculation based on IMF IFS, OECD and ECB data 
Quarterly Volatility Changes 
Now we turn to estimates of conditional STDs of relative RER changes obtained for lower 
frequency (quarterly) data. As it was postulated, since the real variability of exchange rates is 
influenced  by  nominal  variability,  by  working  with  different  frequencies  we  try  to  eliminate  the 
problem of nominal variability in real exchange rate movements. This distinction also serves us as 
a basis for evaluating the differences between asymmetric real and nominal RER shocks.         
Looking at the output of our estimation for selected member states and comparing it with the 
output for the ClubMed, we draw almost the same conclusion as for high frequency data. The  
                                    Studies & Analyses  No. 267 - Do Candidate Countries Fit the Optimum….? 
40 
average stance of CEECs between 1999 and 2003 is closer to that of the ClubMed between 1993-
1995 than between 1996 and 1998. The relative magnitude of RER shocks in these two sub-
samples were, respectively, 1.3 and 2.8 times higher. Since the results for the early 1990s are the 
same as for the high frequency data, we may conclude that neither the degree of nominal nor real 
shocks is more important for accession countries than was the case with average shocks for the 
ClubMed countries. 
 
Figure 4.4 Real Exchange Rate Shocks (quarterly) 
Source: own calculation based on IMF IFS, OECD and ECB data  
 
In almost all cases the magnitude of individual quarterly RER variances was greater than of 
monthly  changes
30
.  Given  that  we  assume  unexpected  quarterly  RER  volatility  to  reflect  real 
shocks, it is clear that asymmetric shocks are still an important source of RER volatility for all CEE 
countries. Also, it is hard to say whether the reported long-run volatility decline was due to policy 
changes,  or  to  common  shocks  hitting  those  countries.  Compared  with  monthly  changes,  the 
decline was significant only for Bulgaria, Estonia, and Slovenia in the second sub-sample, and for 
Latvia and Lithuania in the first sub-sample. But even then, the  size of shocks in Poland and 
Romania was, respectively, 2.8 and 2.3 times bigger than the ClubMed average of 1993-95.  
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Table 4.4 long-run (quarterly data) volatility (candidate countries) 
I  II  III 
White 
Heteroskedasticity  ARCH 
 
VOLATILITY 
CHANGES  93-95  96-98  99-03  93-98  96-03  93-98  96-03 
Bulgaria  No*/Yes*  4.404  7.079  1.679  0.732  0.013  0.016  0.000 
Czech Rep  No/No*  1.365  1.753  2.775  0.395  0.800  0.933  0.045 
Estonia  Yes/Yes*  1.952  1.559  0.693  0.480  0.054  0.870  0.517 
Hungary  Yes/No  2.408  1.618  2.123  MEAN EQ  0.841  0.484  0.404 
Latvia  Yes*/No  4.523  1.880  2.213  0.019  0.188  0.166  0.864 
Lithuania  Yes*/Yes  6.134  4.007  2.151  0.096  0.890  0.462  0.151 
Poland  Yes/No  1.951  1.902  5.220  0.402  0.849  0.111  0.303 
Romania  No/Yes  8.692  8.803  4.255  MEAN EQ  0.430  0.381  0.564 
Slovak Rep. No/Yes  0.656  2.323  2.301  0.905  0.573  0.551  0.694 
Slovenia  No/Yes*  0.521  1.122  0.456  0.454  0.055  0.606  0.656 
Average    3.26  3.20  2.39         
Note: Yes-convergence, No-divergence, i.e., we observe a decrease/increase in standard deviation of real exchange 
rates between the two tested sub-samples (I-II and II-III); 
* - Statistically significant changes in standard deviation of real exchange rates between the two sub-samples (based on 
White  Heteroskedasticity  and  Autoregressive  Conditional  Heteroscedastic  (ARCH)  errors  tests  and  10% 
significance  levels).  If  the  null  hypothesis  is  rejected  then  errors  are  heteroskedastic,  i.e.,  the  changes  in 
conditional RER variances between sub-samples are statistically significant. Columns from 6 to 9 report P-values 
of conducted statistical tests. 
 
Source: own calculation based on IMF IFS, OECD and ECB data 
Turning to individual cases of selected member states, as in the case of monthly shocks, it is 
only  Greece  that  failed  to  lower  the  unexpected  RER  fluctuations  between  two  sub-samples 
leading to the EMU membership. The variance reduction was not statistically significant for France 
and Portugal as well. Similarly to CEECs, the long-run volatility for ClubMed countries was higher if 
compared with the short-run. 
Comparing  real  exchange  rate  shocks  with  unexpected  volatility  of  price  differential  in  the 
respective sub-samples, it is obvious (with an exception of Greece between 1993 and 1995) that 
the  nominal  exchange  rate  did  not  cushion  real  vulnerabilities  and  that  the  exchange  rate 
uncertainty could be eliminated by the creation of the currency union between counties. 
 
 
Table 4.5. Long-run (quarterly data) volatility (member states) 
I  II  III 
White 
Heteroskedasticity  ARCH 
VOLATILITY  
CHANGES 
93-95  96-98  99-03  96-98  96-03  96-98  96-03 
Germany  Yes*  0.751  0.601    0.5314    0.037   
Union  Yes*/No  0.290  0.208  0.244  0.1930  MEAN EQ  0.054  0.237 
France  Yes  0.664  0.452    MEAN EQ    0.752    
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Union  Yes*/No*  0.202  0.091  0.164  MEAN EQ  0.010  0.092  0.084 
Italy  Yes*  3.216  0.779    0.044    0.005   
Union  Yes/Yes  0.314  0.200  0.170  0.257  0.732  0.227  0.601 
Greece  No  0.433  1.537    0.776    0.136   
Union  Yes/Yes  0.614  0.495  0.310  0.690  0.409  0.336  0.738 
Portugal  Yes  1.736  0.657    MEAN EQ    0.504   
Union  Yes*/No  0.628  0.319  0.385  0.025  0.354  0.716  0.893 
Spain  Yes*  2.216  0.420    0.000    0.073   
Union  No/No*  0.389  0.234  0.357  0.331  0.019  0.682  0.057 
Average (ClubMed)  1.900  0.848           
Average (ClubMed; union)  0.486  0.312  0.306         
Note: Yes-convergence, No-divergence, i.e., we observe a decrease/increase in standard deviation of real exchange 
rates between the two tested sub-samples (I-II and II-III); 
* - Statistically significant changes in standard deviation of real exchange rates between the two sub-samples (based on 
White  Heteroskedasticity  and  Autoregressive  Conditional  Heteroscedastic  (ARCH)  errors  tests  and  10% 
significance  levels).  If  the  null  hypothesis  is  rejected  then  errors  are  heteroskedastic,  i.e.,  the  changes  in 
conditional RER variances between sub-samples are statistically significant. Columns from 6 to 9 report P-values 
of conducted statistical tests. 
 
Source: own calculation based on IMF IFS, OECD and ECB data 
Persistence 
As economies become more integrated the changes in real exchange rates should not only be 
smaller,  but  also  less  lasting  (i.e.,  less  persistent).  This  is  because  currency  unions  are 
characterized  by  increased  interregional  trade  as  well  as  factor  movements.  In  short,  within 
currency unions, purchasing power parity should not only be a long-run phenomenon, but should 
also  hold  in  the  short  run  (i.e.,  any  price  differentials  between  two  regions  should  be  quickly 
eliminated). 
To test whether the real exchange rate shocks became less persistent and unpredictable in 
CEE candidate countries over the last decade, we follow von Hagen et al (1994) and look at first 
order  autocorrelation  coefficients  and  the  quantity  of  significant  coefficients.  A  negative  AR(1) 
coefficient and a large number of significant coefficients indicate RER reversion over time. The 
negative  AR(1)  coefficient  ensures  that  following  the  initial  shock  RER  fluctuations  decrease 
rapidly; the large number of significant coefficients minimizes unpredictability in RER fluctuations. 
 
Table 4.6 Persistence (Candidate Countries, monthly data) 
93-95  96-98  99-03  93-95  96-98  99-03 
  Autocorrelation Coefficient 
a  No. of Significant Coefficients 
b 
Bulgaria  0.242  -0.133  0.107  0  0  2 
Czech Rep.  -0.253  0.104  0.135  3  2  0 
Estonia  0.075  0.167  0.062  0  0  4 
Hungary  0.103  0.141  0.135  1  0  0  
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Latvia  0.672  0.420  0.413  2  4  1 
Lithuania  0.666  0.561  0.046  2  4  1 
Poland  0.091  0.743  0.362  1  2  2 
Romania  0.189  0.411  0.207  0  1  0 
Slovak Rep.  -0.549  0.049  0.203  11  0  0 
Slovenia  0.606  0.476  -0.078  1  1  3 
a  First-order autocorrelation coefficient of monthly, seasonally adjusted, RER changes. 
b Number of significant coefficients on lagged terms of RER changes observed in each subsample. 
 
Source: own calculation based on IMF IFS, OECD and ECB data 
 
It is clear from table 4.6 that almost all AR(1) coefficients are of the wrong sign (i.e., positive, 
indicating that following the initial shock RER changes increase to a new level). Only Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, and Slovenia have negative coefficients at least in one estimated sub-sample. 
Also,  the  number  of  significant  coefficients  is  very  small  indicating  that  unexpected  RER 
fluctuations are still present in CEE countries. 
If we compare this finding with the situation of the member states, the results are not that much 
different. Despite more coefficients of the correct sign, the number of significant coefficients is only 
higher for fluctuations in the price differential (see lines in table 4.7 marked Union).    
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Table 4.7 Persistence (Member States, monthly data) 
93-95  96-98  99-03  93-95  96-98  99-03 
  Autocorrelation Coefficient 
a  No. of Significant Coefficients 
b 
Germany  0.030  0.067    0  4   
Union  0.072  -0.141  -0.121  0  0  1 
France  -0.021  -0.074    2  0   
Union  -0.016  -0.234  -0.237  0  3  3 
Italy  0.680  0.261    4  1   
Union  -0.086  -0.141  -0.345  0  0  4 
Greece  -0.029  0.439    3  2   
Union  0.057  0.088  -0.256  0  1  4 
Portugal  0.121  0.232    0  0   
Union  0.470  0.113  0.101  1  1  0 
Spain  0.036  0.026    0  5   
Union  0.728  0.220  -0.033  1  2  6 
a  First-order autocorrelation coefficient of monthly, seasonally adjusted, RER changes. 
b Number of significant coefficients on lagged terms of RER changes observed in each subsample 
 
Source: own calculation based on IMF IFS, OECD and ECB data 
 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
In addition to reviewing the most important theoretical literature on OCA and empirical papers 
related  to  the  accession  countries,  we  attempted  to  assess  the  degree  to  which  candidate 
countries from CEE are ready to join the Euro-zone. We found that these countries are already 
very open to trade with the EU, in many cases much more open than the members of the EU 
themselves. While the share of exports to EU15 in GDP for the Euro-zone amounts to 16%, the 
analogous indicators reach 15% for Poland, 28% for Slovenia, 36% for Estonia and Hungary and 
38% for the Czech Republic. Static business cycle correlations shed a different light. With the 
exception of Hungary and Slovenia, most measure of real activity co-movements point to weak or 
even negative correlations of shocks in the Euro-zone and respective acceding countries. The 
situation is particularly problematic in the case of the unemployment rate which for most countries 
exhibits negative correlation with the Euro-zone unemployment changes. 
Using the nominal and real exchange rate stability criteria, and comparing them with those of 
ClubMed countries in the years preceding the formation of the EMU, our analysis showed that the 
candidate countries as a group resemble the ClubMed countries in the early, rather than, mid 
1990s. Two countries – Estonia and Slovenia – exhibit RER fluctuations similar to or lower than the 
ClubMed countries (irrespective of whether we compared them with the more turbulent period of 
1993 to 1995 or the less turbulent one of 1996 to 1998). As for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,  
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Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovak Republic our results suggest that the real 
exchange rate variability still exceeds that of the ClubMed)
31
.  
However, bearing in mind that ClubMed countries had to maintain their exchange rates in a +/- 
15 per cent band without devaluation (and the European Commission assessment of the countries’ 
eligibility to enter EMU was even more severe and based on their adherence to ERM I margins of 
+/- 2.25 per cent) for two years prior the accession, we can conclude that average unexpected real 
exchange  rate  volatility  for  CEECs  does  not  dramatically  differ  from  volatility  of  the  ClubMed 
countries in years 1993 to 95 and for countries like Estonia and Slovenia it is even lower.   
Even if it was found that quarterly RER fluctuations exceed monthly changes for almost all 
countries,  indicating  that  asymmetric  real  shocks  remain  a  relatively  important  source  of  RER 
variation, it is difficult to treat this as an argument against EMU membership. This is because the 
same is true for ClubMed countries and even France and Germany.  
Clearly, in the CEECs, nominal exchange rate instability is still higher than it was in ClubMed 
countries  before  the  introduction  of  the  Euro.  But  the  fact  that  the  nominal  exchange  rate  in 
ClubMed countries (and in CEECs) did not suppress real volatility indicates that efficiency gains 
can be achieved once the currency union is formed (i.e., through the elimination of exchange rate 
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 Even if Bulgaria and Lithuania are already in the Eurozone with their Euro-denominated currency boards, their 
long-run real exchange rate vulnerability is greater than that of the short run suggesting that more adjustment may be 
required.   
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Source: own calculation based on IMF IFS and ECB data  
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￿ 1996-98 over 1993-95 1999-2003 over 1996-98 
                                    Studies & Analyses  No. 267 - Do Candidate Countries Fit the Optimum….? 
52 
Table 1. Ratio to ClubMed Average (monthly) 
I  II  III     
  93/95  96/98  99/03  99-03/93-95  99-03/96-98 
Bulgaria  3.2  9.4  1.8  1.0  1.8 
Czech Republic  0.7  2.3  2.0  1.2  2.0 
Estonia  1.0  1.1  0.8  0.5  0.8 
Hungary  1.4  1.6  2.2  1.3  2.2 
Latvia  1.8  1.4  2.5  1.5  2.5 
Lithuania  2.7  2.7  2.9  1.7  2.9 
Poland  1.7  2.2  3.5  2.0  3.5 
Romania  3.6  5.8  4.1  2.4  4.1 
Slovak Republic  0.7  1.8  2.6  1.5  2.6 
Slovenia  0.7  1.0  0.6  0.3  0.6 
Average  1.8  2.9  2.3  1.3  2.3 
Source: own calculation based on IMF IFS, OECD and ECB data 
 
Table 2. Ratio to ClubMed Average (quarterly) 
I  II  III     
  93/95  96/98  99/02  99-03/93-95  99-03/96-98 
Bulgaria  2.3  8.3  5.5  0.9  2.0 
Czech Republic  0.7  2.1  9.1  1.5  3.3 
Estonia  1.0  1.8  2.3  0.4  0.8 
Hungary  1.3  1.9  6.9  1.1  2.5 
Latvia  2.4  2.2  7.2  1.2  2.6 
Lithuania  3.2  4.7  7.0  1.1  2.5 
Poland  1.0  2.2  17.1  2.7  6.2 
Romania  4.6  10.4  13.9  2.2  5.0 
Slovak Republic  0.3  2.7  7.5  1.2  2.7 
Slovenia  0.3  1.3  1.5  0.2  0.5 
Average  1.7  3.8  7.8  1.3  2.8 
Source: own calculation based on IMF IFS, OECD and ECB data 
 